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a b s t r a c t
Computability logic (CoL) is a recently introduced semantical platform and research pro-
gram for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal
theory of truth that logic has more traditionally been. Formulas in CoL stand for interactive
computational problems, seen as games between a machine and its environment; logical
operators represent operations on such entities; and ‘‘truth’’ is understood as existence of
an effective solution, i.e., of an algorithmic winning strategy.
The formalism of CoL is open-ended, and may undergo series of extensions as the stud-
ies of the subject advance. Propositional connectives and quantifiers in it come in a variety
of indispensable versions. So far three sorts of conjunction and disjunction – parallel, se-
quential and choice – have been studied, with the first and the third sorts being reminiscent
of the multiplicative and additive operators of linear logic, respectively. The present pa-
per adds one more natural kind to this collection, termed toggling. The toggling operations
can be characterized as lenient versions of choice operations where choices are retractable,
being allowed to be reconsidered any finite number of times. This way, they model trial-
and-error style decision steps in interactive computation. The main technical result of this
paper is constructing a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment
of computability logic whose vocabulary includes all four kinds of conjunction and disjunc-
tion: parallel, toggling, sequential and choice, together with negation. Along with toggling
conjunction and disjunction, the paper also introduces the toggling versions of quantifiers
and recurrence (‘‘exponential’’) operations.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Computability logic (CoL), introduced in [4,9,16], is a semantical, mathematical and philosophical platform, and an
ambitious program, for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth
that logic has more traditionally been.
Under the approach of CoL, formulas represent computational problems, and their ‘‘truth’’ is seen as algorithmic solv-
ability. In turn, computational problems – understood in their most general, interactive sense – are defined as games played
by a machine against its environment, with ‘‘algorithmic solvability’’ meaning existence of a machine that wins the game
against any possible behavior of the environment. And a collection of the most basic and natural operations on interactive
computational problems forms the logical vocabulary of the theory. With this semantics, CoL provides a systematic answer
to the fundamental question ‘‘what can be computed? ’’, just as classical logic is a systematic tool for telling what is true.
Furthermore, as it turns out, in positive cases ‘‘what can be computed’’ always allows itself to be replaced by ‘‘how can be
computed’’, which makes CoL of potential interest in not only theoretical computer science, but many more applied areas
∗ Tel.: +1 610 5197332.
E-mail address: giorgi.japaridze@villanova.edu.
0304-3975/$ – see front matter© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2010.11.037
972 G. Japaridze / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 971–1004
as well, including interactive knowledge base systems, resource oriented systems for planning and action, or declarative
programming languages.
On the logical side, CoL promises to be an appealing, constructive and computationallymeaningful alternative to classical
logic as a basis for applied theories. The first concrete steps towards realizing this potential have beenmade very recently in
[18,19], where the CoL-based versions CLA1 and CLA4 of Peano arithmetic were elaborated. All theorems of the former
express number-theoretic computational problems with algorithmic solutions, and all theorems of the latter express
number-theoretic computational problems with polynomial time solutions. In either case, solutions can be effectively
extracted from proofs, which reduces problem-solving to theorem-proving. Furthermore, CLA4 has also been shown to be
complete in the sense that every number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time solution is represented
by some theorem of the system.
The formalism of CoL is open-ended, and is expected to undergo series of extensions as the studies of the subject
advance. Correspondingly, among the main goals of CoL at the present early stage of development still remains identifying
the most natural and potentially interesting operations on computational problems, and finding axiomatizations for the
corresponding sets of valid formulas. Considerable advances have already beenmade in this direction [5–8,10–15,17,18,21],
and the present paper tells one more success story.
The main operations studied so far are:
• Negation: ¬.
• Constant elementary games (0-ary operations):
– ⊤ (automatically won game) and⊥ (automatically lost game).• Parallel operations:
– ∧ (parallel conjunction) and ∨ (parallel disjunction);
–

(parallel universal quantifier) and

(parallel existential quantifier);
– ∧| (parallel recurrence) and ∨| (parallel corecurrence).• Choice operations:
– ⊓ (choice conjunction) and ⊔ (choice disjunction);
–
Ű
(choice universal quantifier) and
Ű
(choice existential quantifier).• Sequential operations:
– a (sequential conjunction) and ` (sequential disjunction);
–
a
(sequential universal quantifier) and
`
(sequential existential quantifier);
– −∧| (sequential recurrence) and
−∨| (sequential corecurrence).• Blind operations:
– ∀ (blind universal quantifier) and ∃ (blind existential quantifier).• Branching operations:
– ◦| (branching recurrence) and ◦| (branching corecurrence).
The branching operations have a number of natural sharpenings, among which are the finite and the countable versions
of branching recurrence and corecurrence.
There are also various reduction operations:→, defined by A → B = ¬A ∨ B; >–– , defined by A >–– B = ∧| A → B; ◦–– ,
defined by A ◦–– B = ◦| A → B; |>–– , defined by A |>–– B = −∧| A → B; etc.
The present paper introduces the following new group:
• Toggling operations:
– ∧ (toggling conjunction) and ∨ (toggling disjunction);
– ∧ (toggling universal quantifier) and ∧(toggling existential quantifier);
– ∧| (toggling recurrence) and ∨| (toggling corecurrence);
– ◦| (toggling-branching recurrence) and ◦| (toggling-branching corecurrence).
This group also induces the reduction operations >–– and ◦–– , defined by A >–– B = ∧| A → B and A ◦–– B = ◦| A → B.
The main technical result of this paper is constructing a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional
fragment of CoL whose logical vocabulary consists of ¬,⊤,⊥, ∧, ∨, ∧, ∨, a, `, ⊓, ⊔.
2. A quick tour of the operation zoo of computability logic
In this sectionwe give a very brief and informal overview of the language of computability logic and the game-semantical
meanings of its main operators for those unfamiliar with the subject. In what follows,⊤ and⊥ are symbolic names for the
players to which we earlier referred as the machine and the environment, respectively.
First of all, it should be noted that computability logic is a conservative extension of classical logic. Classical propositions
– aswell as predicates as generalized propositions – are viewed as special, elementary sorts of games that have nomoves and
are automatically won by the machine if true, and lost if false. The languages of various reasonably expressive fragments of
computability logicwould typically include two sorts of atoms: elementary atoms p, q, r(x), s(x, y), . . . to represent elementary
games, and general atoms P , Q , R(x), S(x, y), . . . to represent any, not-necessarily-elementary, games. The classically-shaped
operators ¬,∧,∨,→,∀ , ∃ are conservative generalizations of the corresponding classical operations from elementary
games to all games. This means that, when applied to elementary games, they again produce elementary games, and their
meanings happen to coincide with the classical meanings.
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2.1. Constant elementary games
These are two 0-ary ‘‘operations’’, for whichwe use the same symbols⊤ and⊥ as for the two players.⊤ is an elementary
game automatically won by ⊤, and ⊥ is an elementary game won by ⊥. Just as classical logic, computability logic sees
no difference between two true or two false propositions, so that we have ‘‘Snow is white’’=‘‘0=0’’= ⊤ and ‘‘Snow is
black’’=‘‘0=1’’= ⊥.
2.2. Negation
Negation¬ is a role-switch operation:¬A is obtained from A by turning⊤’s (legal)moves andwins into⊥’s (legal)moves
and wins, and vice versa. For example, if Chess means the game of chess from the point of view of the white player, then
¬Chess is the same game from the point of view of the black player.1 And where 0=0 is an elementary game automatically
won by ⊤, ¬0=0 is an elementary game automatically won by ⊥—there are no moves to interchange here, so only the
winners are interchanged. From this explanation it must be clear that ¬, when applied to elementary games (propositions
or predicates), indeed acts like classical negation, as promised.
2.3. Choice operations
The choice operations model decision steps in the course of interaction, with disjunction and existential quantifier
meaning⊤’s choices, and conjunction and universal quantifier meaning choices by⊥. For instance, where f (x) is a function,Ű
x
Ű
y

y= f (x)

is a game in which the first move/choice is by the environment, consisting in specifying a particular value
m for x. Such a move, which intuitively can be seen as asking the question ‘‘what is the value of f (m)? ’’ brings the game
down to the position
Ű
y

y= f (m)

. The next step is by the machine, which should specify a value n for y, further bringing
the game down to the elementary game n= f (m), won by the machine if true and lost if false.⊤’s move n can thus be seen
as answering/claiming that n is the value of f (m). From this explanation it must be clear that
Ű
x
Ű
y

y= f (x)

represents
the problem of computing f , with ⊤ having an algorithmic winning strategy for this game iff f is a computable function.
Similarly, where p(x) is a predicate,
Ű
x
¬p(x)⊔p(x) represents the problem of deciding p(x): here, again, the first move is
by the environment, consisting in choosing a valuem for x (askingwhether p(m) is true); and the next step is by themachine
which, in order to win, should choose the true disjunct of¬p(m) ⊔ p(m), i.e. correctly answer the question. Formally, A ⊔ B
can be defined as¬(¬A⊓¬B), or A⊓ B can be defined as¬(¬A⊔¬B); furthermore, assuming that the universe of discourse
is {1, 2, 3, . . .}, ŰxA(x) can be defined as A(1) ⊓ A(2) ⊓ A(3) ⊓ . . . and
Ű
xA(x) as A(1) ⊔ A(2) ⊔ A(3) ⊔ . . .. It should be
mentioned that making an initial choice of a component by the corresponding player in a choice combination of games is
not only that player’s privilege, but also an obligation: the player will be considered to lose the game if it fails to make a
choice.
2.4. Parallel operations
The parallel operations combine games in a way that corresponds to the intuition of concurrent computations. Playing
A∧ B or A∨ Bmeans playing, in parallel, the two games A and B. In A∧ B,⊤ is considered the winner if it wins in both of the
components, while in A ∨ B it is sufficient to win in one of the components. Then the parallel quantifiers and recurrences
are defined by:
xA(x) = A(1) ∧ A(2) ∧ A(3) ∧ . . .
xA(x) = A(1) ∨ A(2) ∨ A(3) ∨ . . .
∧| A = A ∧ A ∧ A ∧ . . .
∨| A = A ∨ A ∨ A ∨ . . .
To appreciate the difference between choice operations and their parallel counterparts, let us compare the games Chess ∨
¬Chess and Chess⊔¬Chess. The former is, in fact, a simultaneous play on two boards, where on the left board⊤ plays white,
and on the right board⊤ plays black. There is a simple strategy for⊤ that guarantees success against any adversary. All that
⊤ needs to do is to mimic, in Chess, the moves made by⊥ in ¬Chess, and vice versa. On the other hand, winning the game
Chess ⊔¬Chess is not easy: here, at the very beginning,⊤ has to choose between Chess and¬Chess, and then win the chosen
one-board game.
While all classical tautologies automatically holdwhen the classically-shaped operators are applied to elementary games,
in the general (nonelementary) case the class of valid principles shrinks. For example, ¬P ∨ (P ∧ P) is no longer valid. The
above ‘‘mimicking strategy’’ would obviously fail in the three-board game
¬Chess ∨ (Chess ∧ Chess),
1 Here and later, we consider a version of chess with no draw outcomes – for instance, the one where draw is declared to be a win for the black player –
so that each play is won by one of the players and lost by the other player.
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for here the best that⊤ can do is to pair¬Chesswith one of the two conjuncts of Chess∧Chess. It is possible that then¬Chess
and the unmatched Chess are both lost, in which case the whole game will be lost. As much as this example may remind us
of linear logic, it should be noted that the class of principles with parallel connectives validated by computability logic is
not the same as the class of multiplicative formulas provable in linear or affine logic. An example separating CoL from both
linear and affine logics is Blass’s [2] principle
(¬P ∨ ¬Q ) ∧ (¬R ∨ ¬S) ∨ (P ∨ R) ∧ (Q ∨ S),
not provable in affine logic but valid in CoL. The same applies to principles containing choice (‘‘additive’’) and recurrence
(‘‘exponential’’) operators.
2.5. Reduction
The operation→, defined in the standard way by A → B = ¬A∨ B, is perhaps most interesting from the computability-
theoretic point of view. Intuitively, A → B is the problem of reducing B to A. Putting it in other words, solving A → B
means solving B while having A as an (external, environment-provided) computational resource. ‘‘Computational resource’’
is symmetric to ‘‘computational problem’’: what is a problem (task) for the machine, is a resource for the environment, and
vice versa. To get a feel for→ as a problem reduction operator, let us look at reducing the acceptance problem to the halting
problem. The halting problem can be expressed byŰ
x
Ű
y

Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y),
where Halts(x, y) is the predicate ‘‘Turing machine (encoded by) x halts on input y’’. And the acceptance problem can be
expressed byŰ
x
Ű
y

Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y),
with Accepts(x, y) meaning ‘‘Turing machine x accepts input y’’. While the acceptance problem is not decidable, it is
algorithmically reducible to the halting problem. In particular, there is a machine that always wins the gameŰ
x
Ű
y

Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y)→ ŰxŰyAccepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y).
A strategy for solving this problem is to wait till the environment specifies values m and n for x and y in the consequent,
thus asking the question ‘‘does machine m accept input n?’’. In response, ⊤ selects the same values m and n for x and y
in the antecedent (where the roles of ⊤ and ⊥ are switched), thus asking the counterquestion ‘‘does m halt on n?’’. The
environment will have to correctly answer this counterquestion, or else it loses. If it answers ‘‘No’’, then ⊤ also says ‘‘No’’
in the consequent, i.e., selects the right disjunct there, as not halting implies not accepting. Otherwise, if the environment’s
response in the antecedent is ‘‘Yes’’,⊤ simulates machinem on input n until it halts and then selects, in the consequent, the
left or the right disjunct depending on whether the simulation accepted or rejected.
2.6. Blind operations
The blind group of operations comprises ∀ and its dual ∃ ( ∃x = ¬∀x¬). The meaning of ∀xA(x) is similar to that ofŰ
xA(x), with the difference that the particular value of x that the environment ‘‘selects’’ is invisible to the machine (more
precisely, there is no move signifying such a ‘‘selection’’), so that it has to play blindly in a way that guarantees success no
matter what that value is. This way, ∀ and ∃ produce games with imperfect information.
Compare the problemsŰ
x

Even(x) ⊔ Odd(x)
and
∀xEven(x) ⊔ Odd(x).
Both of them are about telling whether an arbitrary given number is even or odd; the difference is only in whether that
‘‘given number’’ is communicated to the machine or not. The first problem is an easy-to-win, two-move-deep game of a
structure that we have already seen. The second game, on the other hand, is one-move deep with only the machine to make
a move—select the ‘‘true’’ disjunct, which is hardly possible to do as the value of x remains unspecified.
As an example of a solvable nonelementary ∀-problem, let us look at
∀xEven(x) ⊔ Odd(x) → ŰyEven(x+y) ⊔ Odd(x+y),
solving which means solving what follows ‘‘∀x’’ without knowing the value of x. Unlike ∀xEven(x) ⊔ Odd(x), this game is
certainly winnable: The machine waits till the environment selects a value n for y in the consequent and also selects one of
the⊔-disjuncts in the antecedent (if either selection is nevermade, themachine automaticallywins). Then: If n is even, in the
consequent the machine makes the same selection left or right as the environment made in the antecedent, and otherwise,
if n is odd, it reverses the environment’s selection.
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2.7. Sequential operations
One of the ways to characterize the sequential conjunction A a B is to say that this is a game that starts and proceeds
as a play of A; it will also end as an ordinary play of A unless, at some point, ⊥ decides – by making a special switch move
– to abandon A and switch to B. In such a case the play restarts, continues and ends as an ordinary play of B without the
possibility to go back to A. A ` B is the same, only here it is⊤ who decides whether and when to switch from A to B. These
generalize to the infinite cases A0
a A1 a A2 a . . . and A0 ` A1 ` A2 ` . . .: here the corresponding player can make any finite
number n of switches, in which case the winner in the play will be the player who wins in An; and if an infinite number of
switches are made, then the player responsible for this is considered the loser. The sequential quantifiers, as we may guess,
are defined bya
xA(x) = A(1) a A(2) a A(3) a . . .
and `
xA(x) = A(1) ` A(2) ` A(3) ` . . . ,
and the sequential recurrence and corecurrence are defined by
−∧| A = A a A a A a . . .
and
−∨| A = A ` A ` A ` . . .
Below are a couple of examples providing insights into the computational intuitions associated with the sequential
operations. See [15] for more.
Let p(x) be any predicate. Then the game
Ű
x
¬p(x) ` p(x) represents the problem of semideciding p(x): it is not hard
to see that this game has an effective winning strategy by ⊤ iff p(x) is semidecidable (recursively enumerable). Indeed,
if p(x) is semidecidable, a winning strategy is to wait until ⊥ selects a particular m for x, thus bringing the game down
to ¬p(m) ` p(m). After that, ⊤ starts looking for a certificate of p(m)’s being true. If and when such a certificate is found
(meaning that p(m) is indeed true), ⊤ makes a switch move turning ¬p(m) ` p(m) into the true and hence ⊤-won p(m);
and if no certificate exists (meaning that p(m) is false), then⊤ keeps looking for a non-existent certificate forever and thus
never makes any moves, meaning that the game ends as¬p(m), which, again, is a true and hence⊤-won elementary game.
And vice versa: any effective winning strategy for
Ű
x
¬p(x) ` p(x) can obviously be seen as a semidecision procedure for
p(x), which accepts an inputm iff the strategy ever makes a switch move in the scenario where⊥’s initial choice of a value
for x ism.
Algorithmic solvability (computability) of games has been shown to be closed under modus ponens and a number of
other familiar or expected rules, such as ‘‘from A and B conclude A∧ B’’, ‘‘from A conclude ŰxA’’, ‘‘from A conclude ∧| A’’, etc.
In view of these closures, the validity (= ‘‘always computability’’) of the principles discussed below implies certain known
facts from the theory of computation. Needless to say, those examples demonstrate howCoL can be used as a systematic tool
for defining new interesting properties and relations between computational problems, and not only reproducing already
known theorems but also discovering an infinite variety of new facts.
The following formula, which can be shown to be valid with respect to our semantics, implies – in a sense, ‘‘expresses’’
– the well known fact that, if both a predicate p(x) and its negation ¬p(x) are recursively enumerable (i.e., p(x) is both
semidecidable and co-semidecidable), then p(x) is decidable:Ű
x
¬p(x) ` p(x) ∧ Űxp(x) `¬p(x)→ Űx¬p(x) ⊔ p(x). (1)
Actually, the validity of (1) means something more than just noted: it means that the problem of deciding p(x) is reducible
to (the ∧-conjunction of) the problems of semideciding p(x) and ¬p(x). In fact, a reducibility in an even stronger sense (in
a sense that has no name) holds, expressed by the following valid formula:
Ű
x
¬p(x) ` p(x) ∧ (p(x) `¬p(x)→ ¬p(x) ⊔ p(x). (2)
Computability logic defines computability of a game A(x) as computability of its
Ű
-closure, so the prefix
Ű
x can be
safely removed in the above formula and, after writing simply ‘‘p’’ instead of ‘‘p(x)’’, the validity of (2) means the same as
the validity of the following propositional-level formula, provable in our sound and complete propositional system CL13:
(¬p ` p) ∧ (p `¬p)→ ¬p ⊔ p. (3)
Furthermore, the above principle is valid not only for predicates (elementary games), but also for all games that we
consider, as evidenced by the provability of the following formula in (the sound) CL13:
(¬P ` P) ∧ (P `¬P)→ ¬P ⊔ P. (4)
Similarly, formula (1) remains valid with P(x) instead of p(x):Ű
x
¬P(x) ` P(x) ∧ ŰxP(x) `¬P(x)→ Űx¬P(x) ⊔ P(x). (5)
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For our next example, remember the relation of mapping reducibility (more often called many-one reducibility) of a
predicate q(x) to a predicate p(x), defined as existence of an effective function f such that, for any n, q

n

is equivalent
to p

f (n)

. It is not hard to see that this relation holds if and only if the game
Ű
x
Ű
y

q(x)→ p(y) ∧ p(y)→ q(x),
whichwe abbreviate as
Ű
x
Ű
y

q(x)↔ p(y), has an algorithmic winning strategy by⊤. In this sense, Űx
Ű
y

q(x)↔ p(y)
expresses the problem of mapping reducing q to p. Then the validity of the following formula implies the known fact that,
if q is mapping reducible to p and p is recursively enumerable, then so is q2:Ű
x
Ű
y

q(x)↔ p(y) ∧ Űx¬p(x) ` p(x)→ Űx¬q(x) ` q(x). (6)
As in the earlier examples, the validity of (6), in fact,means something evenmore: itmeans that the problemof semideciding
q is reducible to the (∧-conjunction of the) problems of mapping reducing q to p and semideciding p.
2.8. Branching operations
The branching operations come in the form of branching recurrence ◦| and its dual branching corecurrence ◦| , which can
be defined by ◦| A = ¬◦|¬A. We have already seen two other – parallel and sequential – sorts of recurrences, and it might be
a good idea to explain ◦| by comparing it with them.
What is common to all members of the family of (co)recurrence operations is that, when applied to A, they turn it into a
game playing which means repeatedly playing A. In terms of resources, recurrence operations generate multiple ‘‘copies’’ of
A, thus making A a reusable/recyclable resource. The difference between the various sorts of recurrences is how ‘‘reusage’’
is exactly understood.
Imagine a computer that has a program successfully playing Chess. The resource that such a computer provides is
obviously something stronger than just Chess, for it permits to play Chess as many times as the user wishes, while Chess,
as such, only assumes one play. Even the simplest operating system would allow to start a session of Chess, then – after
finishing or abandoning and destroying it – start a new play again, and so on. The game that such a system plays – i.e. the
resource that it supports/provides – is the already known to us sequential recurrence −∧| Chess, which assumes an unbounded
number of plays of Chess in a sequential fashion. A more advanced operating system, however, would not require to destroy
the old sessions before starting new ones; rather, it would allow to run as many parallel sessions as the user needs. This is
what is captured by the parallel recurrence ∧| Chess. As a resource, ∧| Chess is obviously stronger than−∧| Chess as it gives the user
more flexibility. But ∧| is still not the strongest form of reusage. A really good operating systemwould not only allow the user
to start new sessions of Chesswithout destroying old ones; it would alsomake it possible to branch/replicate each particular
stage of each particular session, i.e. create any number of ‘‘copies" of any already reached position of the multiple parallel
plays of Chess, thus giving the user the possibility to try different continuations from the same position. What corresponds
to this intuition is the branching recurrence ◦| Chess.
So, the user of the resource ◦| A does not have to restart A from the very beginning every time it wants to reuse it; rather, it
is (essentially) allowed to backtrack to any of the previous – not necessarily starting – positions and try a new continuation
from there, thus depriving the adversary of the possibility to reconsider the moves it has already made in that position. This
is in fact the type of reusage every purely software resource allows or would allow in the presence of an advanced operating
system and unlimited memory: one can start running process A; then fork it at any stage thus creating two threads that
have a common past but possibly diverging futures (with the possibility to treat one of the threads as a ‘‘backup copy’’ and
preserve it for backtracking purposes); then further fork any of the branches at any time; and so on. The less flexible type
of reusage of A assumed by ∧| A, on the other hand, is closer to what infinitely many autonomous physical resources would
naturally offer, such as an unlimited number of independently acting robots each performing task A, or an unlimited number
of computers with limitedmemories, each one only capable of and responsible for running a single thread of process A. Here
the effect of replicating/forking an advanced stage ofA cannot be achieved unless, by good luck, there are two identical copies
of the stage, meaning that the corresponding two robots or computers have so far acted in precisely the same ways. As for
−∧| A, it models the task performed by a single reusable physical resource—the resource that can perform task A over and over
again any number of times.
The operation ◦| also has a series of weaker versions obtained by imposing various restrictions on the quantity and form
of reusages. Among the interesting and natural weakenings of ◦| is the countable branching recurrence ◦| ℵ0 in the style of
Blass’s [1,2] repetition operation R. See [17] for a discussion of such operations.
Branching recurrence◦| stands out as the strongest of all recurrence operations, allowing to reuseA (in◦| A) in the strongest
algorithmic sense possible. This makes the associated reduction operation ◦–– , defined by A ◦–– B = ◦| A → B, the weakest
and hence most general form of algorithmic reduction. The well known concept of Turing reduction has the same claims.
2 By the way, the same principle does not hold with ‘‘Turing reducible’’ instead of ‘‘mapping reducible’’.
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The latter, however, is only defined for the traditional, non-interactive sorts of computational problems—two-step, input–
output, question–answer sorts of problems that in our terms are written as
Ű
x

p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x) (the problem of deciding
predicate p) or
Ű
x
Ű
y

y= f (x)

(the problem of computing function f ). And it is no surprise that our ◦–– , when restricted to
such problems, turns out to be equivalent to Turing reduction. Furthermore, when A and B are traditional sorts of problems,
A ◦–– B further turns out to be equivalent to A >–– B (but not to A |>–– B), as the differences between A >–– B and A ◦–– B, while
substantial in the general (truly interactive) case, turn out to be too subtle to be relevant when A is a game that models only
a very short and simple potential dialogue between the interacting parties, consisting in just asking a question and giving
an answer. The benefits from the greater degree of resource-reusage flexibility offered by A ◦–– B (as opposed to A >–– B)
are related to the possibility for the machine to try different reactions to the same action(s) by the environment in A. But
such potential benefits cannot be realized when A is, say,
Ű
x

p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x), because here a given individual session of A
immediately ends with an environment’s move, to which the machine simply has no legal or meaningful responses at all,
let alone having multiple possible responses to experiment with.
Thus, both ◦–– and >–– are conservative extensions of Turing reduction from traditional sorts of problems to problems
of arbitrary degrees and forms of interactivity. Of these two operations, however, only ◦–– has the moral right to be called
a legitimate successor of Turing reducibility, in the sense that, just like Turing reducibility (in its limited context), ◦––
rather than >–– is an ultimate formal counterpart of our most general intuition of algorithmic reduction. And perhaps it is
no accident that, as shown in [10,13,21], its logical behavior – along with the choice operations – is precisely captured by
Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus. As an aside, this means that CoL offers a good justification – in the form of amathematically
strict and intuitively convincing semantics – of the constructivistic claims of intuitionistic logic, and a materialization of
Kolmogorov’s [20] well known yet so far rather abstract thesis, according to which intuitionistic logic is a logic of problems.
Our recurrence operations, in their logical spirit, are reminiscent of the exponential operators of linear logic. It should
be noted that, as shown in [16], linear – in fact, affine – logic is sound but incomplete when its additives are read as our
choice operators, multiplicatives as parallel operators, and exponentials as either parallel or branching recurrences. Here the
sequential sort of recurrences stands out in that linear logic becomes simply unsound if its exponentials !, ? are interpreted
as our −∧| ,
−∨| . The same applies to the toggling sorts ∧| , ∨| , ◦| , ◦| of recurrences that will be introduced shortly.
Remember the concept of the Kolmogorov complexity k(x) of a number x, which can be defined as the size (loga-
rithm) |m| of the smallest Turing machine (encoded by) m that returns x on input 1. Just like the acceptance problemŰ
x
Ű
y

Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y), the Kolmogorov complexity problem Űx
Ű
y

y=k(x)

is known to be algorithmi-
cally reducible – specifically, Turing reducible – to the halting problem. Unlike the former case, however, the reduction in
the latter case essentially requires repeated usage of the halting problem as a resource. Namely, the reducibility holds only
in the sense of ◦–– , >–– or even |>–– but not in the sense of →. As an exercise, the reader may try to come up with an
informal description of an algorithmic winning strategy for any one of the following games:Ű
x
Ű
y

Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y) ◦–– Űx
Ű
y

y=k(x)
;Ű
x
Ű
y

Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y) >–– Űx
Ű
y

y=k(x)
;Ű
x
Ű
y

Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y) |>–– Űx
Ű
y

y=k(x)

.
2.9. Toggling operations
The new, toggling group of operations forms another natural phylum in this zoo of game operations.
One of the intuitive ways to characterize the toggling disjunction A∨ B is the following. This game starts and proceeds
as a play of A. It will also end as an ordinary play of A unless, at some point,⊤ decides to switch to B, after which the game
becomes and continues as B. It will also end as B unless, at some point, ⊤ decides to switch back to A. In such a case the
game again becomes A, where A resumes from the position in which it was abandoned (rather than from its start position,
as would be the case, say, in A ` B ` A). Later ⊤ may again switch to (the abandoned position of) B, and so on. ⊤ wins the
overall play iff it switches from one component to another (‘‘changes its mind’’, or ‘‘corrects its mistake’’) at most finitely
many times and wins in its final (and hence ‘‘real’’) choice, i.e., in the component which was chosen last to switch to.
An alternative way to characterize A∨ B is to say that it is played exactly as A ∨ B, with the only difference that ⊤ is
expected to make a ‘‘choose A’’ or ‘‘choose B’’ move some finite number of times. If infinitely many choices are made, ⊤
loses. Otherwise, the winner in the play will be the player who wins in the component that was chosen last (‘‘the eventual
choice’’). The case of⊤ having made no choices at all is treated as if it had chosen A (thus, as in sequential disjunction, the
leftmost component is the ‘‘default’’, or ‘‘automatically made’’, initial choice).
It is important to note that the adversary never knows whether a given choice of a component of A∨ B is the last choice
or not (and perhaps ⊤ itself does not know that either, every time it makes a choice honestly believing that the present
choice is going to be final). Otherwise, if ⊤ was required to indicate that it has made its final choice, then the resulting
operation would simply be the same as – more precisely, equivalent to – A ⊔ B. Indeed, in the kind of games that we deal
with (called static games), it never hurts a player to postpone making moves, so the adversary could just inactively wait
till the last choice is declared, and start playing the chosen component only after that, as in the case of A ⊔ B; under these
circumstances, making some temporary choices before making the final choice would not make any sense for⊤, either.
What would happen if we did not require that⊤ can change its mind only finitely many times? There would be no ‘‘final
choice’’ in this case. So, the only natural winning condition in the case of infinitely many choices would be to say that ⊤
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wins iff it simply wins in one of the components. But then the resulting operation would be the same as – more precisely,
equivalent to – our kind old friend ∨, as a smart ⊤ would always opt for keeping switching between components forever.
That is, allowing infinitely many choices would amount to not requiring any choices at all, as is the case with A ∨ B.
One may also ask what would happen if we allowed ⊤ to make an arbitrary initial choice between A and B and then
reconsider its choice only (at most) once? (‘‘n times’’ instead of ‘‘once’’ for any particular n > 1 would not be natural or
necessary to consider). Such an operation on games, albeit reasonable, would not be basic. That is because it can be expressed
through our primitives as (A ` B) ⊔ (B ` A).
Thus, we have four basic and natural sorts A ∨ B, A∨ B, A ` B, A ⊔ B of disjunctions, and denying any of these full
citizenship would make computability logic unsettlingly incomplete. What is common between these four operations and
what warrants the shared qualification ‘‘disjunction’’ is that each one is a ‘‘win one out of two’’ kind of a combination of
games from ⊤’s perspective. A ∨ B is the weakest (easiest for ⊤ to win) kind of a disjunction, as it does not require any
choices at all. Next comes A∨ B, which does require a choice but in the weakest sense possible. A ⊔ B is the hardest-to-win
disjunction, requiring a choice in the strongest sense. A ` B is the next-hardest disjunction. It replaces the strict choice of
A ⊔ B by the next-strictest kind known in the traditional theory of computation as semidecision.
Does the (very) weak sort of choice captured by ∨ have a meaningful non-mathematical, everyday-life counterpart?
Obviously it does. This is the kind of choice that one would ordinarily call (making a correct) choice after trial and error. So,
an alternative, sexier name for our toggling operations could perhaps be ‘‘trial-and-error operations’’. Indeed, a problem is
generally considered to be solved after trial and error (a correct choice/solution/answer found) if, after perhaps coming up
with several wrong solutions, a true solution is eventually found. That is, mistakes are tolerated and forgotten as long as
they are eventually corrected. It is however necessary that new solutions stop coming at some point, so that there is a last
solution whose correctness determines the success of the effort. Otherwise, if answers have kept changing all the time, no
answer has really been given after all. Or, imagine Bob has been married and divorced several times. Every time he said ‘‘I
do’’, he probably honestly believed that this time, at last, his bride was ‘‘the one’’, with whom he would live happily ever
after. Bob will be considered to have found his Ms. Right after all if and only if one of his marriages indeed turns out to be
happy and final.
Back from our detour to the layman’s world, as we already know, for a predicate p(x),
Ű
x
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x) expresses
the problem of deciding p(x), and
Ű
x
¬p(x) ` p(x) expresses the weaker problem of semideciding p(x). What is then
expressed by
Ű
x
¬p(x)∨ p(x)? This is also a decision-style problem, but still weaker than the problem of semideciding
p(x). This problem has been studied in the literature under several names, most common of which probably is recursively
approximating p(x) (cf. [3], Definition 8.3.9). It means telling whether p(x) is true or not, but doing so in the same style as
semideciding does in negative cases: by correctly saying ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ at some point (after perhaps taking back previous
answers several times) and never reconsidering this answer afterwards. Observe that semideciding p(x) can be seen as
always saying ‘‘No’’ at the beginning and then, if this answer is incorrect, changing it to ‘‘Yes’’ at some later time; so, when
the answer is negative, this will be expressed by saying ‘‘No’’ and never taking back this answer, yet without ever indicating
that the answer is final and will not change.3 Thus, the difference between semideciding and recursively approximating
is that, unlike a semidecision procedure, a recursive approximation procedure can reconsider both negative and positive
answers, and do so several times rather than only once.
According to Shönfield’s Limit Lemma,4 a predicate p(x) is recursively approximable (i.e., the problem of its recursive
approximation has an algorithmic solution) iff p(x) is of Turing degree ≤∅′, that is, p(x) is Turing reducible to the halting
problem. It is known that this, in turn, means nothing but having the arithmetical complexity∆2, i.e., that both p(x) and its
negation can bewritten in the form ∃z∀ys(z, y, x), where s(z, y, x) is a decidable predicate.5 In the theory of computability-
in-principle (as opposed to, say, complexity theory), by importance, the class of predicates of complexity ∆2 is only next
to the classes of decidable, semidecidable and co-semidecidable predicates. This class also plays a special role in logic: it is
known that a formula of classical predicate logic is valid if and only if it is true in everymodel where all atoms of the formula
are interpreted as predicates of complexity∆2.
To see that recursive approximability of a predicate p(x) is equivalent to this predicate’s being of complexity ∆2, first
assume that p(x) is of complexity ∆2, so that p(x) = ∃z∀yq(z, y, x) and ¬p(x) = ∃z∀yr(z, y, x) for some decidable
predicates q(z, y, x) and r(z, y, x). Then
Ű
x
¬p(x)∨ p(x) is solved by the following strategy. Wait till the environment
specifies a value m for x, thus bringing the game down to ¬p(m)∨ p(m). Then initialize both i and j to 1, choose the p(m)
component, and do the following:
Step 1: Checkwhether q(i, j,m) is true. If yes, increment j to j+1 and repeat Step 1. If not, switch to the¬p(m) component,
reset j to 1, and go to Step 2.
Step 2: Check whether r(i, j,m) is true. If yes, increment j to j+1 and repeat Step 2. If not, switch to the p(m) component,
reset j to 1, increment i to i+1, and go to Step 1.
3 Unless, of course, the procedure halts by good luck. Halting without saying ‘‘Yes’’ can then be seen as an explicit indication that the original answer
‘‘No’’ was final.
4 Cf. [3], Lemma 8.3.12.
5 See Section 5.1 of [3] for a definition of all classes of the arithmetical hierarchy, including∆n (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .).
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With a moment’s thought, one can see that the above algorithm indeed solves
Ű
x
¬p(x)∨ p(x).
For the opposite direction, assume a given algorithmA solves
Ű
x
¬p(x)∨ p(x). Let q(z, y, x) be the predicate such that
q(i, j,m) is true iff, in the scenario where the environment specified x as m at the beginning of the play, so that the game
was brought down to¬p(m)∨ p(m), we have:
• at the ith computation step,A chose the p(m) component;
• at the jth computation step,A did not move.
Quite similarly, let r(z, y, x) be the predicate such that r(i, j,m) is true iff, in the scenario where the environment specified
x asm at the beginning of the play, so that the game was brought down to¬p(m)∨ p(m), we have:
• either i=1 or, at the ith computation step,A chose the ¬p(m) component;
• at the jth computation step,A did not move.
Of course, both q(z, y, x) and r(z, y, x) are decidable predicates, and hence so are y>z → q(z, y, x) and y>z → r(z, y, x).
Now, it is not hard to see that p(x) = ∃z∀yy>z → q(z, y, x) and ¬p(x) = ∃z∀yy>z → r(z, y, x), so that p(x) is
indeed of complexity∆2.
As a real-life example of a predicate which is recursively approximable but neither semidecidable nor co-semidecidable,
consider the predicate k(x)<k(y), saying that number x is simpler than number y in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity. It
is known that k(z) (the Kolmogorov complexity of z) is bounded, never exceeding the size (logarithm) |z| of z plus a certain
constant c. Fix this c. Here is an algorithm which recursively approximates the predicate k(x)<k(y), i.e., solves the problemŰ
x
Ű
y
¬k(x)<k(y)∨ k(x)<k(y).
Wait till the environment brings the game down to ¬k(m)<k(n)∨ k(m)<k(n) for some m and n. Then start simulating, in
parallel, all Turing machines of sizes ≤min(|m|, |n|)+c on input 1. Whenever you see that a machine t returns m and the
size of t is smaller than that of any other previously found machines that returnm or n on input 1, choose k(m)<k(n). Quite
similarly, whenever you see that a machine t returns n and the size of t is smaller than that of any other previously found
machine that returns n on input 1, as well as smaller or equal to the size of any other previously foundmachines that return
m on input 1, choose¬k(m)<k(n). Obviously, the correct choice between¬k(m)<k(n) and k(m)<k(n)will be made sooner
or later and never reconsidered afterwards. This will happen when the procedure hits – in the role of t – a smallest machine
that returns eitherm or n on input 1.
Once we have toggling disjunction, its dual operation of toggling conjunction A∧ B can be defined in a fully symmetric
way, with the roles of the machine and the environment interchanged. That is, here it is the environment rather than the
machine that makes choices. Equivalently, A∧ B can be defined as¬(¬A∨¬B).
The toggling versions of quantifiers and recurrences are defined in the same way as in the case of parallel or sequential
operations. Namely:
∧xA(x) = A(1)∧ A(2)∧ A(3)∧ . . .
∧
xA(x) = A(1)∨ A(2)∨ A(3)∨ . . .
∧| A = A∧ A∧ A∧ . . .
∨| A = A∨ A∨ A∨ . . .
There is yet another natural sort ◦| , ◦| of toggling (co)recurrence operations worth considering. We call these toggling-
branching recurrence and toggling-branching corecurrence, respectively. Roughly, ◦| , ◦| are the same to ◦| , ◦| as ∧| , ∨| are to ∧| , ∨| .
Namely, a play over ◦| A proceeds as over ◦| A, with the difference that now ⊤ is required to make a choice – which can be
reconsidered any finite number of times – of a particular session/branch of A out of the many sessions that are being played.
As with all other toggling operations, if choices are retracted infinitely many times, ⊤ loses. Otherwise, the winner in the
overall game will be the player which wins in the session of A that was chosen last. ◦| A, as expected, is the dual of ◦| A, which
can be defined by interchanging the roles of the two players, or by ◦| A = ¬◦|¬A.
For our last example illustrating CoL operations at work, remember that Kolmogorov complexity k(x) is not a computable
function, i.e., the problem
Ű
x
Ű
y

y=k(x)

has no algorithmic solution. However, replacing
Ű
y with
∧
y in it yields an
algorithmically solvable (yet nontrivial) problem. A solution for
Ű
x
∧
y

y=k(x)

goes like this. Wait till the environment
chooses a numberm for x, thus bringing the game down to
∧
y

y=k(m)

, i.e., to
1=k(m)∨ 2=k(m)∨ 3=k(m)∨ . . . (7)
Initialize i to a sufficiently large number, such as i= |m|+c (c is the constant mentioned earlier), and then do the following
routine:
ROUTINE: Choose the ith ∨ -disjunct of (7). Then start simulating on input 1, in parallel, all Turing machines whose
sizes are smaller than i. If and when you see that one of suchmachines returnsm, update i to the size of that machine,
and repeat ROUTINE.
A similar argument convinces us that the problems
Ű
x∨|
Ű
y

y=k(x)

and
Ű
x◦|
Ű
y

y=k(x)

also have algorithmic
solutions. So do the problems∧x ∧yy=k(x) and x ∧yy=k(x), but certainly not the problem ∀x ∧yy=k(x).
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3. Toggling and sequential operations defined formally
In what follows, we rely on the first six sections of [16] as an external source. Although long, [16] is very easy to read
and has a convenient glossary6 to look up any unfamiliar terms and symbols. A reader not familiar with [16] or unwilling to
do some parallel reading, may want to either stop here or just browse the rest of the paper without attempting to go into
the technical details of formal definitions and proofs. Due to the very dynamic recent development, computability logic has
already reached a point where it is no longer feasible to reintroduce all relevant concepts all over again in each new paper
on the subject—this would make any significant or fast progress within the project near impossible.
Here we only provide formal definitions for the toggling and sequential operations. Definitions of all other relevant
operations are found in [16]. Definitions of sequential operations are also given in [15] in a form technically different
from our present one, but otherwise yielding equivalent (in every reasonable sense) concepts, and whether to adopt the
definitions of [15] or the present definitions of sequential operations is purely a matter of taste or convenience. As for
toggling operations, they have never been defined before.
In the definitions of this section, following [16], we use the notation Γ α – where Γ is a run and α is a string – for the
result of deleting from Γ all labmoves (labeled moves) except those that have the form ℘αβ for some string β and player
℘, and then further replacing each such remaining labmove ℘αβ by ℘β .
Definition 3.1. Let A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any constant games. Let us agree that, in the context of a toggling or sequential
disjunction or conjunction of these games, a switchmove–or just a switch–means themove/string i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(here we identify natural numbers with their decimal representations). When there are finitely many switches in a run Γ ,
by the active component of a toggling or sequential combination of A1, . . . , An in Γ we mean Ai such that i is the last
(rightmost) switch move in Γ ; in case there are no switch moves in Γ at all, A1 is considered to be the active component.
The components other than the active one are said to be dormant.
1. The toggling disjunction A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An of A1, . . . , An is defined as follows:
• A positionΦ is a legal position of A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An iff every move ofΦ is either a switch by⊤, or the move i.α by either
player, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α is some string, and the following condition is satisfied: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},Φ i.
is a legal position of Ai.
• Let Γ be a legal run of A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An. Then Γ is a⊤-won run of A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An iff there are finitely many switches (by
⊤) in Γ and, where Ai is the active component of A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An in Γ , Γ i. is a⊤-won run of Ai.
2. The toggling conjunction A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An of A1, . . . , An is defined as follows:
• A positionΦ is a legal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An iff everymove ofΦ is either a switch by⊥, or is themove i.α by either
player, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α is some string, and the following condition is satisfied: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},Φ i.
is a legal position of Ai.
• Let Γ be a legal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. Then Γ is a⊥-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An iff there are finitely many switches (by
⊥) in Γ and, where Ai is the active component of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An in Γ , Γ i. is a⊥-won run of Ai.
3. The sequential disjunction A1
`
. . .
` An of A1, . . . , An is defined exactly as A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An, with the only difference
that, in order for a position Φ to be a legal position of A1
`
. . .
` An, it should satisfy the following additional condition:
Whenever i1, i2, . . . , ij is the sequence of the switch moves made (by⊤) inΦ , we have i1 =2, i2 =3, . . . , ij = j+1.
4. The sequential conjunction A1
a
. . .
a An of A1, . . . , An is defined exactly as A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An, with the only difference
that, in order for a position Φ to be a legal position of A1
a
. . .
a An, it should satisfy the following additional condition:
Whenever i1, i2, . . . , ij is the sequence of the switch moves made (by⊥) inΦ , we have i1 =2, i2 =3, . . . , ij = j+1.
As we see, a legal run Γ of A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An is nothing but a legal run of A1∨ . . .∨An with perhaps some switchmoves by⊤
inserted. As in the case of ∨, such a Γ is seen as a parallel play in the n components, with the play (run) in each component
Ai being Γ i.. The meaning of a switch move is that of a retractable choice of a disjunct. As we remember from [16], in order
to win a parallel disjunction, it is sufficient for⊤ to win in any one of its disjuncts. Winning a toggling disjunction is harder:
here it is necessary for⊤ towin in the disjunct that was chosen last. The difference between A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An and A1 ` . . . ` An
is that, while in the former switches/choices can go back and forth and the same component can be re-chosen many times,
in the latter the chosen component should always be the one next after the previously chosen component. And, as always,
either sort of conjunction is a dual of the corresponding sort of disjunction, obtained from it by interchanging the roles of⊤
and⊥.
A reasonable behavior in a toggling or sequential combination of static games by either player is to always assume that
the latest choice of a component is final, correspondingly play only in the (currently) active component of the combination,
and worry about the other components only if and when they become active. This is so because eventually the outcome of
the game will be determined by what happened in the (then) active component. If there are strategically useful moves in a
dormant component, they can always wait till that component becomes active (if and when this happens), as postponing
moves in a static game never hurts a player. Yet, this ‘‘reasonable’’ behavior is not enforced by the rules of the game, and
6 The glossary for the published version of [16] is given at the end of the book (rather than article), on pages 371–376. The reader may instead use the
preprint version of [16], available at http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0507045. The latter includes both the main text and the glossary.
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‘‘unreasonable’’ yet innocent actions such as making moves in dormant components are legal. This particular design choice
in Definition 3.1 has been made purely for the considerations of simplicity. Alternative definitions that yield equivalent
operations but are more restrictive/demanding on legal behaviors are not hard to come up with. One example is the
definition of sequential operations given in [15]. In any case, however, obtaining such definitions would not be just as
straightforward as declaring all moves in dormant components illegal—doing so could violate the important condition that
the operations should preserve the static property of games. As we remember from [16], computability logic and its static
games are asynchronous-communication-friendly. If the communication between the two players is asynchronous, ⊥ (in
the case of ∨ or ` ) or ⊤ (in the case of ∧ or a ) cannot be sure that the component it considers ‘‘active’’ and in which
it wants to make a move is indeed still active; it is possible that the component has already been ‘‘deactivated’’ by the
adversary, but this information has not arrived yet.
As an aside, the existence of a variety of alternative definitions for our game operations and their robustness (modulo
equivalence) with respect to technical variations is a strong indication of the naturalness of those operations. This is in the
same sense as the existence of many equivalent versions of Turing machines and other models of computation, and the
robustness of the class of computable functions with respect to those variations, is one of the strongest pieces of empirical
evidence in favor of the Church–Turing thesis. Among the interesting alternatives to our present definitions of the four
sorts of disjunctions, most clearly showing the similarities and differences between them, is the following. (1) Keep the
definition of ∨ (from [16]) unchanged. (2) Define ∨ as in Definition 3.1, with the only difference that not having made any
switch/choice moves is now considered a loss for⊤ (there is no ‘‘default’’ choice, that is). (3) Define ` as the version of (the
new) ∨ where the choices are required to be consecutive numbers starting from 1. (4) Define ⊔ as the version of (the new)
∨ where one single choice is allowed. Thus, the differences between the four disjunctions are in howmany (if any) choices,
and in what order, are required or allowed.
For the sake of readability, in what follows we will often employ relaxed, intuitive and semiformal terminology when
referring to moves, typically naming them by their meanings or effects on the game instead of the actual strings that those
moves are. Consider, for example, the game (A⊔B)∧(C⊓D)∨ (E⊓F) and the legal run ⟨⊤1.1,⊥2.1.1,⊤2.2,⊥2.2.2,⊤2.1⟩
of it. We may say that:
• The effect of the move 1.1 by ⊤ is (or such a move signifies) choosing A within the A ⊔ B component. Notice that after
this move is made in (A ⊔ B) ∧ (C ⊓ D)∧ (E ⊓ F), the game is brought down to – in the sense that it continues as –
A ∧ (C ⊓ D)∨ (E ⊓ F). We may also refer to making the move 1.1 in the overall game as making the move 1 in its left
∧-conjunct, because this is exactly the meaning of the move 1.1.
• The effect of the next move 2.1.1 by⊥ is choosing C in the C ⊓D component. Such a move further brings the game down
to A ∧ C ∨ (E ⊓ F).
• The effect of the next, switch move 2.2 by ⊤ is activating the right component of C ∨ (E ⊓ F), or switching from C to
E ⊓ F in it. Remember that initially the active component of a toggling combination is always the leftmost component.
Such a component in our case was C ⊓ D, which later became (evolved to) C .
• The effect of the next move 2.2.2 by ⊥ is choosing F in the E ⊓ F component. This brings the overall game down to
A ∧ (C ∨ F), where the active (sub)component within the C ∨ F component is F .
• The effect of the lastmove 2.1 by⊤ is switching from F back to C in the C ∨ F component, i.e.making the right component
dormant and the left component active, as was the case when the game started.
Definition 3.1 straightforwardly extends from the n-ary cases to the infinite cases A1 ∨ A2 ∨ . . ., A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . .,
A1
` A2 ` . . . and A1 a A2 a . . . by just changing ‘‘i ∈ {1, . . . , n}’’ to ‘‘i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}’’.
Even though we have officially defined ∨, ∧, `, a only for constant games, our definitions extend to all games in the
standard way, as explained in the second paragraph of Section 4 of [16]. Namely, for any not-necessarily-constant games
A1, . . . , An, A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An is the unique game such that, for any valuation (assignment of constants to variables) e, we have
e[A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An] = e[A1] ∨ . . . ∨ e[An]. Similarly for ∧, `, a and the infinite versions of ∨, ∧, `, a. (Themeaning of the
notation e[. . .], just like themeanings of any other unfamiliar terms or notations, as already noted, can and should be looked
up in [16].)
Whenever new game operations are introduced, one needs to make sure that they preserve the static property of games,
for otherwise many things can go wrong:
Theorem 3.2. The class of static games is closed under (both the n-ary and the infinite versions of) ∨ , ∧ , ` , a .
Proof. Given in Appendix. 
The remaining definitions of this section are not relevant to the subsequent sections of the paper, and we include them
here just for the purposes of officially registering all toggling operations (and re-registering all sequential operations) as
full-fledged inhabitants of the operation zoo of computability logic.
The toggling and sequential sorts of quantifiers and (co)recurrences, as we already know from Section 2, are defined
as follows:
Definition 3.3. For any games A or A(x):
1. ∧| A = A∧ A∧ A∧ . . . and ∨| A = A∨ A∨ A∨ . . .;
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2. −∧| A = A a A a A a . . . and −∨| A = A ` A ` A ` . . .;
3. ∧xA(x) = A(1)∧ A(2)∧ A(3)∧ . . . and ∧xA(x) = A(1)∨ A(2)∨ A(3)∨ . . .;
4.
a
xA(x) = A(1) a A(2) a A(3) a . . . and `xA(x) = A(1) ` A(2) ` A(3) ` . . ..
It is not hard to see that the DeMorgan dualities hold for the toggling and sequential operations, just as they do for all
other groups of operations (parallel, choice, branching, blind). Namely, we have:
¬(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) = ¬A1 ∨ . . . ∨¬An,
¬(A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An) = ¬A1 ∧ . . . ∧¬An,
and similarly for sequential conjunction and disjunction, as well as infinite versions of toggling and sequential operations,
including ◦| A, ◦| A,∧xA(x), ∧xA(x), −∧| A, −∨| A, axA(x),`xA(x).
Defining the toggling-branching group ◦| , ◦| of (co)recurrences is not as easy as defining the (just) toggling group ∧| , ∨| .
Let us first reproduce – or, perhaps rather rephrase – from [16], in a compact form, the definition of branching recurrence ◦|
and the associated intuitions.
In semiformal terms, a play of ◦| A starts as an ordinary play of game A. At any time, however, player⊥ is allowed to make
a ‘‘replicative move’’, which creates two copies of the current position Φ of A. From that point on, the game turns into two
games played in parallel, each continuing from position Φ . We use the bits 0 and 1 to denote those two threads—threads
that have a common past (positionΦ) but possibly diverging futures. Again, at any time,⊥ can further branch either thread,
creating two copies of the current position in that thread. If thread 0was branched, the resulting two threadswill be denoted
by 00 and 01; and if the branched thread was 1, then the resulting threads will be denoted by 10 and 11. And so on: at any
time, ⊥ may split any of the existing threads w into two threads w0 and w1. Each thread in the eventual run of the game
will be thus denoted by a (possibly infinite) bit string. The game is considered won by⊤ if it wins A in each of the threads;
otherwise the winner is⊥.
In fully formal terms, there are two types of legal moves in (legal) positions of ◦| A: (1) replicative and (2) non-replicative.
To define these, let us agree that by an actual node7 of a position Φ we mean a bit string w such that w either is empty,8
or else is u0 or u1 for some bit string u such that Φ contains the move u:. A replicative move can only be made by (is only
legal for) ⊥, and such a move in a given position Φ should be w:, where w is an actual node of Φ and Φ does not already
contain the same movew:.9 As for non-replicative moves, they can be made by either player. Such a move by a player ℘ in
a given position Φ should be w.α, where w is an actual node of Φ and α is a move such that, for any infinite bit string v, α
is a legal move by ℘ in position Φ≼wv of A.10 Here and later, for a run Θ and bit string x, Θ≼x means the result of deleting
from Θ all moves except those that look like u.β for some initial segment u of x, and then further deleting the prefix ‘‘u.’’
from such moves.11 A legal run Γ of ◦| A is considered won by ⊥ iff, for some infinite bit string v, Γ ≼v is a ⊥-won run of A.
This completes our definition of ◦| .
Now we are ready to define ◦| A. The legal runs of this game are defined as those of ◦| A, with the only difference that the
former can now include any number of ‘‘switch’’ moves made by ⊥ (and only ⊥). Each switch move made in a position Φ
is nothing but one of the actual nodes of Φ . Next, a legal run Γ is considered won by ⊥ iff there are only finitely many
switch moves made in it and, wherew is the last one of such moves and v isw with infinitely many 0s appended to it, Γ ≼v
is a ⊥-won run of A. If no switch moves were made at all, the above w is assumed to be the empty bit string, so that v is
the infinite string of 0s. This completes our definition of ◦| . The operation ◦| is defined by interchanging ⊥ with ⊤ in this
definition. Equivalently, it can be defined by ◦| A = ¬◦|¬A.
We claim that, just like all other operations defined in this section, the operations ◦| and ◦| preserve the static property
of games. This claim can be proven by adapting to ◦| the proof of the similar theorem about ◦| given in [4]. The latter is fairly
technical, for which reason we let the present claim remain without a proof—no results of this paper depend on it, anyway.
4. Logic CL13
In this section we introduce the new propositional system CL13.12 The building blocks of its language are:
• Infinitely many nonlogical elementary atoms, for which we use the metavariables p, q, r, s.
• Infinitely many nonlogical general atoms, for which we use the metavariables P,Q , R, S.
• The 0-ary operators⊤ and⊥. They can as well be called logical atoms.
• The unary operator¬.
7 Intuitively, an actual node is (the name of) an already existing thread of a play over A.
8 Intuitively, the empty string is the name/address of the initial thread; all other threads will be descendants of that thread.
9 The intuitive meaning of movew: is splitting threadw intow0 andw1, thus ‘‘actualizing’’ these two new nodes/threads.
10 The intuitive meaning of such a movew.α is making move α in threadw and all of its (current or future) descendants.
11 Intuitively, Θ≼x is the run of A that has been played in thread x, if such a thread exists (has been generated); otherwise, Θ≼x is the run of A that has
been played in (the unique) existing thread which (whose name, that is) is some initial segment of x.
12 In this name, ‘‘CL’’ stands for ‘‘computability logic’’, and ‘‘13’’ indicates that this is the 13th formal system for CoL introduced so far.
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• The operators ∧, ∨, ∧, ∨, a, `, ⊓, ⊔. Their arities are not fixed and can be any n ≥ 2.13
Formulas, to which we refer as CL13-formulas, are built from atoms and operators in the standard way, with the
requirement (yielding no loss of expressiveness) that ¬ can only be applied to nonlogical atoms. A literal means L or ¬L,
where L is an atom. Such a literal is said to be elementary, general, nonlogical or logical if L is so. When F is not a nonlogical
atom, ¬F is understood as an abbreviation defined by:
• ¬¬E = E;
• ¬⊤ = ⊥ and ¬⊥ = ⊤;
• ¬(E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En) = ¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬En and ¬(E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En) = ¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬En;
• ¬(E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En) = ¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨¬En and ¬(E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En) = ¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧¬En;
• ¬(E1 a . . . a En) = ¬E1 ` . . . `¬En and¬(E1 ` . . . ` En) = ¬E1 a . . . a¬En;
• ¬(E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En) = ¬E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬En and ¬(E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En) = ¬E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬En.
Also, if we write E → F , it is to be understood as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F . Simplicity is the only reason for our choice to
treat→ and¬ as abbreviations: doing otherwisewould lengthen the definition of system CL13, as well as the related proofs,
due to the necessity to additionally/separately consider the cases of negative occurrences of operators in formulas. Note that
our design choice does not yield any loss of expressive power: the games A → B and ¬A ∨ B are not only equivalent, but
simply equal; similarly for ¬¬A vs. A, ¬(A ∧ B) vs. ¬A ∨ ¬B, etc.
Parentheses will often be omitted for the sake of readability. When doing so, we agree that¬ has the highest precedence,
and→ has the lowest precedence. So, for instance,¬P ⊔ Q → R∧ S means ((¬P) ⊔ Q )→ (R∧ S).
Formulas that do not contain general atomswe call elementary-base. This terminology also extends to the corresponding
fragment of CL13. In particular, the elementary-base fragment of CL13 is the set of all elementary-base theorems of CL13.
An interpretation for the language of CL13 is a function ∗ that sends each nonlogical elementary atom p to an elementary
game p∗, and sends each general atom P to any, not-necessarily-elementary, static game P∗. This mapping extends to all
formulas by letting it respect all logical operators as the corresponding game operations. That is, ⊤∗ = ⊤, (E ∧ F)∗ =
E∗ ∧ F∗, etc. When F∗ = A, we say that ∗ interprets F as A.
Recall, from [16], the models HPM (‘‘hard-play machine’’) and EPM (‘‘easy-play machine’’) of interactive computation.
Very briefly, an HPM is Turing machine with the capability of making moves and with full reading access to all relevant
information on the game played, such as its ‘‘current’’ position at any given time, as well as the ‘‘actual’’ values of
the parameters (variables) on which the game may depend; the environment can make any number of moves at any
computation step of an HPM, with such moves being the only nondeterministic events from the HPM’s perspective. An EPM
means the same, with the difference that the environment can move only when the machine explicitly ‘‘grants permission’’
to do so, with the machine required to grant permission infinitely many times during the play. CoL defines computability of
a game as existence of an HPM that wins the game against every possible behavior of the environment. It has been shown
that, when the games under question are static, replacing ‘‘HPM’’ with ‘‘EPM’’ in this definition yields (extensionally) the
same concept of computability. Since our interpretations are required to interpret atoms as static games and all of our game
operations preserve the static property of games, the two – HPM and EPM –models of computation are equivalent in every
relevant respect.
A formula F is said to be valid iff, for every interpretation ∗, the game F∗ is computable. And F is uniformly valid iff there
is an EPM (or, equivalently, HPM) S, called a uniform solution of F , such that S wins (computes) F∗ for every interpretation
∗. See Sections 7 and 8 of [16] for a discussion of the intuitions associated with these concepts.
Our treatment further relies on the following terminology, notation and conventions:
• We often need to differentiate between subformulas as such, and particular occurrences of subformulas. We will be using
the term osubformula (‘‘o’’ for ‘‘occurrence’’) to mean a subformula together with a particular occurrence. The prefix ‘‘o’’
will be used with a similar meaning in terms such as oatom, oliteral, etc. So, for instance, the formula P ∧ Q → P has
two atoms but three oatoms. Yet, we may still say ‘‘the oatom P ’’, assuming that it is clear from the context which of the
possibly many occurrences of P is meant. Similarly for osubformulas and oliterals.
• An occurrence of an osubformula is positive iff it is not in the scope of ¬. Otherwise it is negative. According to our
conventions regarding the usage of¬, only oatoms may be negative.
• A politeral is a positive oliteral.
• A ∧ -(sub)formula is a (sub)formula of the form F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn. Similarly for ∨, ∧,∨, a,`, ⊓, ⊔.
• A sequential (sub)formula is one of the form F1 a . . . a Fn or F1 ` . . . ` Fn. We say that F1 is the head of such a
(sub)formula, and F2, . . . , Fn form its tail.
• Similarly, a parallel (sub)formula is one of the form F1 ∧ . . .∧ Fn or F1 ∨ . . .∨ Fn, a toggling (sub)formula is one of the
form F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn or F1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fn, and a choice (sub)formula is one of the form F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn or F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Fn.
13 The reason why we do not restrict these operators to their strictly binary versions is that doing so could lengthen rather than shorten many definitions
and proofs. This is related to the fact that, while the games (A ∧ B) ∧ C and A ∧ B ∧ C are certainly equivalent, they are still not the same unless A, B, C are
elementary. Similarly for ∨,⊓,⊔.
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• A formula is said to be quasielementary iff it contains no general atoms and no operators other than
¬,⊤,⊥,∧,∨, ∧, ∨.
• A formula is said to be elementary iff it is a formula of classical propositional logic, i.e., contains no general atoms and
no operators other than¬,⊤,⊥,∧,∨.
• A semisurface osubformula (or occurrence) is an osubformula (or occurrence) that is not in the scope of any choice
connectives (i.e., ⊓ and ⊔).
• A surface osubformula (or occurrence) is an osubformula (or occurrence) that is not in the scope of any connectives
other than ¬,∧,∨.
• The quasielementarization of a formula F , denoted by |F |, is the result of replacing in F every sequential osubformula
by its head, every ⊓-osubformula by⊤, every ⊔-osubformula by⊥, and every general politeral by⊥ (the order of these
replacements does not matter). For instance,
|((P ∨ q) ∨ ((p ∧ ¬P) a (Q ∧ R)))∧ (q ⊓ (r ⊔ s))| = ((⊥∨ q) ∨ (p ∧⊥))∧⊤.
• The elementarization of a quasielementary formula F , denoted by ‖F‖, is the result of replacing in F every ∧ -
osubformula by⊤ and every ∨ -osubformula by⊥ (again, the order of these replacements does notmatter). For instance,
‖(s ∧ (p∧ (q∨ r))) ∨ (¬s ∨ (p∨ r))‖ = (s ∧⊤) ∨ (¬s ∨⊥).
• A quasielementary formula F is said to be stable iff its elementarization ‖F‖ is a tautology of classical logic. Otherwise F
is instable.
Definition 4.1. We define our deductive system CL13 by the following six rules of inference, where P → F means ‘‘from
premise(s) P conclude F ’’:
(∧): H⃗ → F , where F is a stable quasielementary formula, and H⃗ the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following
condition:
• Whenever F has a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, H⃗ contains the result of replacing
in F that osubformula by Ei.
(∨): H → F , where F is a quasielementary formula, and H is the result of replacing in F a surface osubformula
E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(
a⊓): |F |, H⃗ → F , where F is a non-quasielementary formula (note that otherwise F = |F |), and H⃗ is the smallest set of
formulas satisfying the following two conditions:
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, H⃗ contains the result of
replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 a E2 a . . . a En, H⃗ contains the result of replacing in F that
osubformula by E2
a
. . .
a En.14
Wewill be referring to the above formula |F | as the senior premise of the rule (or its conclusion), and referring to
the formulas of H⃗ as junior premises.
(⊔): H → F , whereH is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1⊔ . . .⊔En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(
`
): H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 ` E2 ` . . . ` En by E2 ` . . . ` En.14
(M): H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F two – one positive and one negative – semisurface occurrences of
some general atom P by a nonlogical elementary atom p that does not occur in F .
Axioms are not explicitly stated, but the set of premises of the (∧) rule can be empty, in which case (the conclusion of)
this rule acts like an axiom.
A CL13-proof of a formula F can be defined as a sequence of formulas ending with F such that every formula follows
from some (possibly empty) set of earlier formulas by one of the rules of the system.
Example 4.2. In view of the discussions of Section 2.9, the formula (¬p∨ p)∧ (¬q∨ q)→ ¬(p∧ q)∨ (p∧ q) expresses –
or rather implies – the known fact that, if two predicates p and q are recursively approximable, then so is their intersection
p∧q. The following sequence is a CL13-proof of this formula, re-written into its official form (p∧¬p)∨(q∧¬q)∨(¬p∨
¬q)∨ (p ∧ q):
1. (p ∨ q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q) (∧): {}
2. (p ∨ q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∨): 1
3. (p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q) (∧): {}
4. (p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∨): 3
5.

p ∨ (q∧¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {2,4}
6. (¬p ∨ q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q) (∧): {}
14 In this definition and later, if n=2, E2
a
. . .
a
En or E2
` · · ·`En is simply understood as E2 .
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7. (¬p ∨ q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∨): 6
8. (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {}
9. (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∨): 8
10.
¬p ∨ (q∧¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {7,9}
11.

(p∧¬p) ∨ q ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {2,7}
12.

(p∧¬p) ∨ ¬q ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {4,9}
13.

(p∧¬p) ∨ (q∧¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q)∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {5,10,11,12}
Example 4.3. Pick any two distinct connectives AND1 and AND2 from the list ∧, ∧, a, ⊓. Then CL13 proves the formula
PAND1Q → PAND2Q if and only if AND1 is to the left of AND2 in the list. Similarly for the list ⊔, `, ∨, ∨. Below we verify this
fact only for the case {AND1, AND2} = {∧,a}. The reader may want to try some other combinations as exercises.
Here is a CL13-proof of P ∧ Q → P a Q :
1. ¬p ∨ p (∧): {}
2. (¬p∨⊥) ∨ p (∨): 1
3. ¬q ∨ q (∧): {}
4. (¬p∨¬q) ∨ q (∨): 3
5. (¬p∨¬Q ) ∨ Q (M): 4
6. (¬p∨¬Q ) ∨ (p a Q ) (a⊓): {2,5}
7. (¬P ∨¬Q ) ∨ (P a Q ) (M): 6
On the other hand, the formula P a Q → P ∧ Q , i.e. (¬P `¬Q ) ∨ (P ∧ Q ), has no proof. This can be shown through
attempting and failing to construct, bottom-up, a purported CL13-proof of the formula. Here we explore one of the branches
of a proof-search tree. (¬P `¬Q )∨ (P ∧ Q ) is not quasielementary, so it could not be derived by (be the conclusion of) the
(∨) or (∧) rule. The (⊔) rule does not apply either, as there is no⊔ in the formula. This leaves uswith one of the rules (`), (a⊓)
and (M). Let us see what happens if our target formula is derived by (`). In this case the premise should be ¬Q ∨ (P ∧ Q ).
The latter can be derived only by (a⊓) or (M). Again, let us try (M). The premise in this subcase should be ¬q ∨ (P ∧ q) for
some elementary atom q. But the only way ¬q ∨ (P ∧ q) can be derived is by (a⊓) from the premise ¬q ∨ (⊥∧ q). This
formula, in turn, could only be derived by (∧), in which case ¬q ∨ ⊥ is one of the premises. Now we are obviously stuck,
as ¬q ∨ ⊥ is not the conclusion of any of the rules of the system. We thus hit a dead end. All remaining possibilities can be
checked in a similar routine/analytic way, and the outcome in each case will be a dead end.
Exercise 4.4. Construct CL13-proofs of formulas (3) and (4) from Section 2.7.
In similar analytic exercises, one can verify that the provabilities (⊢) and unprovabilities (⊬) shown in the following table
hold. From the table we can see that each sort of disjunction exhibits a unique logical behavior even when taken in isolation
from the other sorts. The same, of course, is the case for conjunctions.
OR = ∨ OR = ∨ OR = ` OR = ⊔
¬P OR P ⊢ ⊬ ⊬ ⊬
P OR Q → Q OR P ⊢ ⊢ ⊬ ⊢
P OR P → P ⊬ ⊬ ⊬ ⊢
p OR p → p ⊢ ⊢ ⊢ ⊢
The present version of CL13 is not syntactically optimal in the sense that certain alternative design choices could offer
considerably shorter proofs. Namely, the (∧) rule and, especially, the (a⊓) rule are generally quite expensive in that they
may sometimes require toomany premises. Optimizing (at the expense of simplicity) the systemor finding various shortcuts
(admissible rules) to reduce proof sizes would be a purely syntactic job which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Below we only point out – without a proof – one of the ways to improve the efficiency of proofs and analytic proof-search
procedures:
Claim 4.5. The set of CL13-provable formulas would remain the same if we redefined the concept of a semisurface occurrence by
imposing the additional condition that such an occurrence should not be in the tail of any sequential osubformula.
Below comes our main theorem. Its soundness part will be proven in Section 5, and its completeness part will be proven
in Section 7.
Theorem 4.6. CL13 ⊢ F iff F is valid (for any CL13-formula F). Furthermore:
(a) There is an effective procedure that takes a CL13-proof of an arbitrary formula F and constructs an EPM S such that, for
every interpretation ∗, S computes F∗.
(b) If CL13 ⊬ F , then F∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that interprets all elementary atoms of F as finitary
predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆3, and interprets all general atoms of F as problems of the form (A11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A1m) ⊓ . . . ⊓
(Am1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Amm), where each Aji is a finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity∆3.
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The following facts are immediate corollaries of Theorem 4.6, so we state them without proofs:
Fact 4.7. A CL13-formula is valid iff it is uniformly valid.
Fact 4.8. CL13 is a conservative extension of classical logic. That is, an elementary formula is provable in CL13 iff it is a classical
tautology.
In addition, one can easily see that CL13 is closed under the standard rules of logic, such as Modus Ponens and
Substitution, provided that, when applying Substitution, elementary atoms are only replaced by elementary formulas.
It is also worth noting that CL13 is decidable, with a brute force decision algorithm obviously running in at most
polynomial space. Whether there are more efficient algorithms is unknown.
The remaining sections of this paper are devoted to a proof of Theorem 4.6. Two immediate predecessors of that theorem
are similar results proven in [6] for the a, `, ∧, ∨ -free fragment CL2 of CL13, and in [15] for the ∧, ∨ -free fragment CL9
of CL13. The proofs of both soundness and completeness given in [6] were very detailed, to the extent of being pedantically
so. As a result, they were fairly long, even though concerning a relatively modest and simple fragment of the logic. The
soundness and completeness proofs given in [15] were less detailed, yet still pretty formal. The proofs given in the present
paper are far less detailed and quite informal. Continuing proving things in full technical detail in the earlier style would
make both writing and reading papers in CoL increasingly difficult, as the studies of the subject advance and the depth
and breadth of the results keep increasing. The proofs given in [6,15] can serve as illustrations of the fact that relaxed
and semiformal arguments like the ones relied upon in the present paper can always be turned into strict formal proofs
if necessary. The proofs given in the following sections are meant for an advanced reader who has well internalized the
concepts and techniques of computability logic.
5. The soundness of CL13
Very briefly, the idea behind our soundness proof for CL13 can be outlined as follows. Every CL13-proof of a formula F , in
fact, encodes an input- and interpretation-independent winning strategy (EPM) S for F∗. This is a recursive strategy, which
acts depending on by which of the rules of CL13 the formula was obtained from its premise(s).
If F is derived by (∨), Smakes amove signifying a switch to the corresponding ∨ -disjunct in the corresponding subgame
of F , this way essentially bringing the game F down to its premise. For instance, if F is E ∧ (G1 ∨ G2) and it is derived
from E ∧ G2, then 2.2 is such a move. After this, S calls itself on the premise, which, by the induction hypothesis, it knows
how to win. Similarly, if F is derived by (⊔), S makes a move signifying a choice of the corresponding ⊔-disjunct in the
corresponding subgame of F ; and if F is derived by (`), S makes a move signifying a switch to the next (second) ` -disjunct
in the corresponding subgame of F .
Next, suppose F is derived by the (M) rule from the premise H , namely, H is the result of replacing, in F , two general
politerals P,¬P by some elementary politerals p,¬p. This is a signal for S that, from now on, through applying copycat,
its should ‘‘match’’, i.e. ‘‘synchronize’’, the corresponding two subgames (the ones now represented by p and ¬p) to ensure
that they evolve in essentially the same ways, so that, eventually, one of them will be won. This allows us to safely pretend
(at least in our present, very relaxed description/analysis) that the games represented by p and ¬p are elementary (with
one being the negation of the other) and thus the game played by S from now on is, in fact, H . The latter, by the induction
hypothesis, will be won.
Next, suppose F is derived by the (a⊓) rule. Then S simply plays |F | (the senior premise of F ) until the environmentmakes
a move signifying a choice of a ⊓- or a -conjunct in some ⊓- or a -subgame of F , in which case S quits its play of |F | and
calls itself on the corresponding junior premise of F , which it wins according to the induction hypothesis. If, however, the
above event never occurs, the overall playwill finish (or continue forever) as a play of |F |which, by the induction hypothesis,
will be won by S. This, in turn, can be seen to imply that F will also be won, because playing F in the scenario where no
moves associated with its choice and sequential components are made, essentially means nothing but simply playing the
quasielementarization |F | of F .
Finally, suppose F is derived by (∧). This is the hardest case to explain in non-technical terms and, for simplicity, let us
assume that F has a single surface occurrence of a ∧ -subformula, namely of E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En. As we remember, the default
active (‘‘chosen’’) ∧ -conjunct of such a component is E1. Let us write Ei instead, because the original value 1 of imay change
later, anyway. Let Hi be the premise of F resulting from the latter by replacing E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En with its active component Ei.
What S does in this case is that it simply plays Hi, which it knows how to win (by the induction hypothesis), and winning
whichmeanswinning F as long as Ei remains active. Such a playmay, however, be interrupted by one of the following events.
One possible event is that, while S is playing Hi, the environment ‘‘activates’’ some new ∧ -conjunct Ej of the E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En
component of F . Then S abandons its play ofHi and switches to a play ofHj instead, whereHj is the corresponding premise of
F . Another possibility is that the current play of F , itself, is takingplacewithin a procedure call by a previous similar procedure
associated with a (∧)-derived formula F ′ (which, for simplicity, we also assume to have a single surface occurrence of a ∧ -
subformula), and the environment suddenly ‘‘changes its mind’’ and activates a new ∧ -conjunct of the ∧ -subcomponent
of that F ′. Then, again, S abandons its current play of Hi and switches to a play of H ′j , where H
′
j is the corresponding premise
of F ′. Yet another possibility is that the current play of F is taking place within a procedure call by a previous procedure
associated with a (a⊓)-derived formula F ′, and the environment makes a move that signifies a choice of a ⊓-conjunct or a
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(new) a -conjunct in some⊓- or a -subcomponent of that F ′. In this case, S abandons F and calls itself on the corresponding
premise of F ′. After properly taking care of certain details that we have suppressed and (over)simplified, this strategy can
be shown to guarantee a win for S.
But, again, the above was just a rough preliminary description of the proof idea. What follows is a relatively detailed
materialization of that outline. We start by stating the following general fact, which is a reproduction of Lemma 4.7 of [4]:
Lemma 5.1. Assume A is a constant static game, ℘ is either player, ¬℘ is ℘ ’s adversary (the other player), and Υ ,Ω are runs
such thatΩ is a ℘-delay of Υ . Then:
1. IfΩ is a ℘-illegal run of A, then so is Υ .
2. If Υ is a ¬℘-illegal run of A, then so isΩ .
Throughout this section, we fix F as an arbitrary CL13-provable formula. Our goal is to (show how to) construct a uniform
solution for F .
We fix aCL13-proof T of F . In the preceding section, such aproofwould bepresented in the formof a sequence of formulas.
But now we prefer to see T as a tree. Namely, T is a tree where with each node b is associated – let us say F -associated – a
formula, which we denote by F (b), such that the formula associated with the root is F and, for each node b of T , whenever
c1, . . . , cn are the children of b, F (b) follows from F (c1), . . . ,F (cn) by one of the rules of inference. We will refer to such
a (fixed for each b) rule as the justification of b. Note that the justification of a leaf (childless node) can only be (∧), as any
other rule requires at least one premise.
When the justification of a given node is the (a⊓) rule, the child with which the senior premise isF -associated is said to
be the senior child of the node, and the children with which junior premises are associated are said to be junior children.
We may safely assume that, in the CL13-proof that we consider, the (M) rule never introduces into the premise an
elementary atom that is already introduced this way elsewhere in the proof, or that had occurrences in the original formula
F . Under this assumption, we agree to call each elementary atom p that was introduced in T by an application of (M) (in the
bottom-up view of this rule), as well as the corresponding literals p and ¬p, pseudoelementary. The general atom P that
was replaced by p in this process will be said to be the origin of p. We also say that the above ¬p (resp. p) is thematching
literal of p (resp. ¬p).
As will be seen, intuitively, the formulasF -associated with the nodes of T are partial, compressed representations of the
games (‘‘positions’’) to which the original game F evolves at different stages of a play according to the strategy that we are
going to construct. Tomake both a description and an analysis of that strategy easier, we need fuller representations of those
games. For this purpose we use additional expressions called hyperformulas. These are nothing but formulas with perhaps
some osubformulas underlined (such underlines can be iterated), and containing15 no nonlogical (general, elementary
or pseudoelementary) atoms other than those occurring in formulas F -associated with the nodes of T . In addition, each
hyperformula satisfies the following conditions:
• In every parallel osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En or E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En, no component Ei is underlined.
• In every toggling osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En or E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En, at most one component Ei is underlined. If no component
is underlined, such an osubformula is said to be virgin.
• In every choice osubformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En or E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En, at most one component Ei is underlined. If no component
is underlined, such an osubformula is said to be virgin. The non-underlined components of a non-virgin choice
osubformula, as well as all osubformulas of such components, are said to be abandoned.
• In every sequential osubformula E1 ` . . . ` En or E1 a . . . a En, exactly one component Ei is underlined. The occurrence
of a component Ej which is to the left of such Ei (i.e., j< i), as well as all osubformulas of Ej, are said to be abandoned.
As will be seen later, underlines in a hyperformula H carry certain information about the ‘‘current position’’ of the game.
Namely, an underlined component of a choice osubformula is one that has already been selected by the corresponding
player in a choice move associated with that osubformula, and an underlined component of a non-abandoned sequential or
toggling osubformula is its ‘‘currently active’’ component.
With each node b of T , in addition to the formulaF (b), we also associate – let us sayH-associate – a hyperformula,which
will be denoted by H(b). Such a hyperformula is always the original formula F with some osubformulas underlined and
some (pairs of positive and negative) occurrences of general atoms replaced by pseudoelementary atoms. The association
will be such that F (b) is always essentially a ‘‘fragment’’ of H(b), obtained from the latter by deleting certain parts, and
abbreviating certain other parts through ⊤ and ⊥. Hence, to every occurrence of a subformula in F (b) corresponds – in
an obvious sense almost requiring no explanation but which will still be explained shortly for safety – an occurrence of a
subformula inH(b). As we are going to see, this correspondence will be such that the following conditions are satisfied for
each node b of the tree:
Condition (i): To an occurrence of a subformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En in F (b) always corresponds an occurrence of the form
G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn (no Gi is underlined) inH(b). Similarly for ⊓.
15 Here ‘‘containing’’ refers to the whole formula rather than the underlined parts.
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Condition (ii): To an occurrence of a subformula E1
` E2 ` · · · ` En in F (b) always corresponds an occurrence of the form
H1
`
. . .
` Hm ` G1 ` G2 ` · · · ` Gn inH(b). Similarly for a .
Condition (iii): To an occurrence of a subformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En in F (b) always corresponds an occurrence of the form
G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn (no Gi is underlined) inH(b). Similarly for ∧ .
Condition (iv): To an occurrence of a nonlogical (general, elementary or pseudoelementary) literal in F (b) always
corresponds an occurrence of the same literal in H(b). We extend the concept of pseudoelementary atoms
or literals of formulas, and the ‘‘matching’’ relation between them, to the corresponding atoms or literals of
hyperformulas.
Here is a description of the associationH , together with the meaning of the above-mentioned relation ‘‘corresponds’’. In
each case, it is immediately obvious (by induction) that the above conditions (i)–(iv) are satisfied.
1. With the root node of T we H-associate the hyperformula F˜ obtained from F by underlining the leftmost component
of each sequential osubformula (and nothing else). To each occurrence of each subformula of F corresponds the same
occurrence of the same subformula of F˜ (the latter may only differ from the former in that it is in the scope of some
underlines).
2. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c) by the (M) rule, namely, F (c) is the result of replacing in F (b) two semisurface
general politerals P and ¬P by some (pseudo)elementary politerals p and ¬p. Then H(c) is the result of replacing in
H(b) the corresponding two occurrences of P and ¬P (remember Condition (iv)) by p and ¬p. To the occurrences p and
¬p in F (c) correspond the occurrences of the same p and¬p inH(c); all other correspondences (also) remain the same
as before— as in F (b) versusH(b), that is.
Thus, the effect of the (M) rule onH(b) is the same as its effect on F (b).
3. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c) by the (⊔) rule, namely, F (c) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface
osubformula E1⊔ . . .⊔En by Ei. ThenH(c) is the result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding
osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn (remember Condition (i)). To the occurrence of Ei in F (c) corresponds the occurrence of Gi in
H(c); all other correspondences (also) remain the same as before.
Thus, while the effect of the (⊔) rule (seen bottom-up) onF (b) is replacing a⊔-osubformula by one of its components,
the effect of the same rule onH(b) is simply underlining that (the corresponding) component, without deleting anything.
4. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c) by the (`) rule, namely, F (c) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface
osubformula E1
` E2 ` . . . ` En by E2 ` . . . ` En. Then H(c) is the result of replacing in H(b) the corresponding
osubformula H1
`
. . .
` Hm ` G1 ` G2 ` . . . ` Gn (remember Condition (ii)) by H1 ` . . . ` Hm ` G1 ` G2 ` . . . ` Gn. To
the occurrence of E2
`
. . .
` En in F (c) corresponds the occurrence of H1 ` . . . ` Hm ` G1 ` G2 ` . . . ` Gn in H(c)
unless n=2, in which case to the occurrence of E2 in F (c) corresponds simply the occurrence of G2 in H(c); all other
correspondences remain the same as before.
Thus, while the effect of the (`) rule (seen bottom-up) on F (b) is deleting the head of a ` -osubformula, the effect
of the same rule on H(b) is simply moving the underline one position to the right, otherwise preserving all earlier –
abandoned – components of the ` -osubformula.
5. SupposeF (b) is obtained fromF (c0),F (c1), . . . ,F (ck) by the (
a⊓) rule, where c0 is the senior child of b and c1, . . . , ck
(k ≥ 0) are the junior children. Then:
• H(c0) = H(b). If G′ is an osubformula of F (c0) that replaced an old osubformula G of F (b) when transferring from
F (b) to F (c0) = |F (b)| , then to G′ corresponds the same osubformula of H(c0) as the osubformula of H(b) that
corresponded to G; all other correspondences remain the same as before.
Remember that, on the other hand, F (c0) = |F (b)|. Thus, while F (c0) is obtained from F (b) through
‘‘abbreviating’’ each general politeral and each ⊔-osubformula as ⊥, ‘‘abbreviating’’ each ⊓-osubformula as ⊤ and
‘‘abbreviating’’ each sequential osubformula as its head,H(c0) is just an exact copy ofH(b).
• Suppose F (cj) (1≤ j≤k) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En by Ei. ThenH(cj) is
the result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (remember
Condition (i)). To the occurrence of Ei in F (cj) corresponds the occurrence of Gi inH(cj); all other correspondences
(also) remain the same as before.
Thus, while F (cj) is the result of replacing in F (b) a ⊓-osubformula by one of its components, the transition from
H(b) toH(cj) simply underlines that component.
• Suppose F (cj) (1≤ j≤k) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface osubformula E1 a E2 a . . . a En by
E2
a
. . .
a En. Then H(cj) is the result of replacing inH(b) the corresponding osubformula H1 a . . . a Hm a G1 a G2a
. . .
a Gn by H1 a . . . a Hm a G1 a G2 a · · · a Gn (remember Condition (ii)). To the occurrence of E2 a . . . a En in
F (cj) corresponds the occurrence of H1
a
. . .
a Hm a G1 a G2 a . . . a Gn in H(cj) unless n=2, in which case to the
occurrence of E2 in F (cj) corresponds the occurrence of G2 inH(cj); all other correspondences remain the same as
before.
Thus, while F (cj) is the result of deleting in F (b) the head of a
a -osubformula, a transition from H(b) to
H(cj) simply moves the underline in the corresponding
a -osubformula one position to the right, without otherwise
deleting the abandoned component(s).
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6. SupposeF (b) is obtained fromF (c)by the (∨) rule, namely,F (c) is the result of replacing inF (b) a surface osubformula
E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En by Ei. ThenH(c) is the result of underlining inH(b) the ith componentGi of the corresponding osubformula
G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn (remember Condition (iii)). To the occurrence of Ei in F (c) corresponds the occurrence of Gi inH(c); all
other correspondences (also) remain the same as before.
Thus, while the transition from F (b) to F (c) in the present case picks Ei and deletes all other components of
E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En, the transition fromH(b) toH(c) simply underlines the ‘‘picked’’ component without deleting anything.
7. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c1), . . . ,F (ck) by the (∧) rule. Then:• Suppose F (cj) (1≤ j≤k) is the result of replacing in F (b) a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En by Ei. Then H(cj) is
the result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn (remember
Condition (iii)). To the occurrence of Ei in F (cj) corresponds the occurrence of Gi inH(c); all other correspondences
(also) remain the same as before.
Thus, while F (cj) is the result of picking Ei and deleting all other components of E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En in F (b), the
transition fromH(b) toH(cj) simply underlines the ‘‘picked’’ component without deleting anything.
The following lemma can be verified through a straightforward analysis of the above construction by induction on the
distance of a given node from the root:
Lemma 5.2. Let b be any node of T .
1. Suppose the justification of b is one of the rules (M), (⊔), (`) or (a⊓). Then F (b) is the result of replacing in H(b) every
non-virgin choice osubformula by its underlined component, removing from every sequential osubformula the abandoned
components (the order of these changes does not matter), and deleting all underlines.
2. Suppose the justification of b is one of the rules (∨) or (∧). ThenF (b) is the result of replacing inH(b) every general politeral by
⊥, every virgin ⊔-osubformula by⊥, every virgin ⊓-osubformula by⊤, every non-virgin choice osubformula, every sequential
osubformula and every non-virgin toggling osubformula by its underlined component, and deleting all underlines (again, the
order of replacements does not matter).
Aswe remember, our goal is to construct amachine’s strategy that wins e[F∗] for any interpretation ∗ and valuation e. Let
us fix somearbitrary ∗ and e for the rest of this section.Weprefer to define and analyze our strategy in termsof hyperformulas
rather than formulas. When H is a hyperformula, H∗ will be simply understood as G∗, where G is the formula resulting from
H by removing all underlines and replacing each pseudoelementary atom by its origin.16 Hence, rephrasing our goal, it is
constructing amachine’s interpretation-independent strategy that wins F˜∗, where F˜ is the hyperformulaH-associatedwith
the root of T . Such a strategy will be presented in the form of an EPM, which we call S.
Thework of ourmachine Swill rely on neither ∗ nor e, sowe shall usually omit these parameters andwrite a hyperformula
E where, strictly speaking, the game E∗ or the constant game e[E∗] is meant. That is, we identify hyperformulas or their
subformulas with the corresponding games. Accordingly, any terminology that we could use for games and their subgames
we can as well use for hyperformulas and their subformulas, and vice versa. This includes the usage of our ‘‘o’’ terminology:
we may, for instance, say ‘‘the osubgame G of G ∧ H ’’ to mean the subgame of the game/formula G ∧ H represented by the
osubformula G.
For simplicity and convenience, in our construction of S and our analysis of its work, we implicitly rely on what in [16] is
called the clean environment assumption—the assumption according to which the adversary never makes illegal moves.
Indeed, if the adversary makes an illegal move, S automatically wins no matter what happens later, so such cases are not
worth considering.
Definition 5.3. Let E be a hyperformula. We say that a run Γ is E-adequate iff the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Γ is a legal run of E.
2. Whenever a given non-abandoned choice osubformula of E is virgin, no moves have been made in Γ signifying a choice
of a component in that osubformula.
3. Whenever a component Gi of a given choice osubformula of E is underlined, Γ contains a move signifying a choice of Gi
in that osubformula.
4. Whenever a given component of a non-abandoned sequential or toggling osubformula of E is underlined, that component
is the active component17 of the corresponding subgame of E in the run Γ .18
5. Γ does not contain any⊤-labeled moves signifying moves within general oliterals of E.
6. Assume p and ¬p are non-abandoned pseudoelementary politerals of E, Θ+ is the sequence of labmoves made (during
playing Γ ) within the p component of E, andΘ− is the sequence of labmoves made within the¬p component. ThenΘ+
is a⊤-delay of¬Θ− (remember from [16] that, for a runΩ ,¬Ω means the result of changing all labels to their opposites
inΩ).
16 We can see that, this way, for any node b, the game (H(b))∗ is identical to F∗ .
17 Remember from Definition 3.1 that the active component is the last-chosen component, or the default first component if there were no choices at all;
if infinitely many choices occurred, then no component is considered active.
18 More precisely, in the run Γ ′ which is the subsequence of those labmoves of Γ – with certain prefixes deleted – that signify labmoves within the
sequential or toggling osubformula of E. For instance, if E is G ∨ (H a K) and the osubformula we are talking about is H a K , then such a Γ ′ is Γ 2. .
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The above technical concept will play a central role in our soundness proof. The main intuition here is that, when Γ is
E-adequate, the hyperformula E accurately represents all relevant information about the position resulting from playing
Γ , so that E can be seen as an ‘‘adequate’’ description of that position; also, ⊤ has played ‘‘wisely’’ so far in a way that
allows it to further maintain this ‘‘adequacy’’ and eventually win. Namely, ignoring the abandoned components that are
no longer relevant, we have the following. The absence of an underline in a choice osubformula of E indicates that no
choice of a component has been made in the corresponding subgame (condition 2). On the other hand, if an underline is
present in such an osubformula, it shows which component has been chosen (condition 3). The underline in a sequential
or toggling osubformula indicates the active component of the corresponding subgame (condition 4). Also, the subgames in
the ‘‘matched’’ occurrences of atoms have evolved to – in a sense – the same games (condition 6), and⊤ has not made any
hasty moves in unmatched atoms (condition 5), so that, if and when at some later point such an atom finds a match,⊤will
still have a chance to ‘‘even out’’ the corresponding two subgames.
During its work, our machine Smaintains a record bwhich, intuitively, represents the node of T which is currently being
‘‘visited’’ by S. Initially, b is the root of T . From any given current(ly visited) non-leaf node b, S always moves (‘‘jumps’’) to
one of its children c. This way, it always follows one of the branches of the tree until it hits a leaf. Once it reaches a leaf, it
will either stay there forever, or will backtrack by jumping to one of the siblings of one of the predecessors of that leaf. Then
it starts another upward journey from that node towards a leaf, and so on.
Our description of the work of S, i.e. of the procedure WORK that it follows, as well as our further analysis of it, will
rely – more often implicitly than explicitly – on the earlier-listed Conditions (i)–(iv), the description of the associationH ,
Lemma 5.2 and the following lemma which, with Lemma 5.1 in mind, can be verified by a straightforward analysis of the
steps of WORK (left to the reader):
Lemma 5.4. At any time S jumps to a given node b of T (here the time of initializing b counts as the time of ‘‘jumping’’ to the
root), the then-current positionΦ of the play isH(b)-adequate.
How S jumps from one node to another, and what moves (if any) it makes on each such transition, depends on the
justification of the node, and also –when the justification is (∧) – onwhether the node is a leaf or not. So, belowwe describe
each possible case separately. In each case, b stands for the ‘‘current node’’, andΦ stands for the position reached ‘‘by now’’
in the overall play of the original game. This is exactly how the procedure WORK followed by S goes:
ProcedureWORK: S jumps to the root of T (i.e., initializes the record b to the root). Then it acts depending on which of
the conditions of the following seven cases is satisfied by b:
Case 0: The justification of b is the (M) rule. Let c be the child of b. So,H(c) is the result of replacing inH(b) two general
politerals P and ¬P by some pseudoelementary politerals p and ¬p. Then S looks up in Φ all moves made by
the adversary within the politeral P , and makes/copies those moves – in the same order as they are made by the
adversary – within the politeral ¬P . Similarly, it mimics, in ¬P , all moves made by the adversary within P . After
that, S jumps to c (that is, S updates the content of the record b to c).
Case 1: The justification of b is the (⊔) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has a virgin osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn, and
H(c) results fromH(b) by underlining Gi for some 1≤ i≤n. Then S makes the move that signifies a choice of the
ith component in the osubgame G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 2: The justification of b is the (`) rule. Let c be the child of b. So,H(b) has an osubformula G1 ` . . . ` Gi−1 ` Gi ` Gi+1`
. . .
` Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by moving the underline from Gi to Gi+1. Then S makes the move that
signifies switching (from Gi) to Gi+1 in the corresponding osubgame, and jumps to c.
Case 3: The justification of b is the (a⊓) rule. Then S simply jumps to the senior child of b.
Case 4: The justification of b is the (∨) rule. Let c be the child of b. So,H(b) has a virgin osubformulaG1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn, andH(c)
results fromH(b) by underlining one of the n components Gi. Then S makes the move that signifies switching to
Gi in G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 5: The justification of b is the (∧) rule, and b is not a leaf. Let E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En be the leftmost surface ∧ -osubformula of
F (b), and let G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn be the corresponding osubformula ofH(b). UsingΦ , S looks up the currently (in the
position Φ , that is) active component Gi of the osubgame G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn. Note that among the children of b is a
node c such thatH(c) is the result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the osubformula G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn.
Then S jumps to that c .
Case 6: The justification of b is the (∧) rule, and b is a leaf. Let us say that a pseudoelementary politeral ofH(b) iswidowed
iff its matching politeral is abandoned. This is how S acts. It keeps granting permission until the adversary makes
a move. If such a move is a move within an abandoned component ofH(b), within a general oliteral or within a
widowed pseudoelementary oliteral, S does not react and continues granting permission. If the adversary makes
a move within a non-abandoned and non-widowed pseudoelementary politeral p or ¬p, then S makes the same
move in thematching politeral¬p or p, and continues granting permission. If no events other than the above kinds
of events ever happen, S will remain at b forever. However, a typical development during a visit of a leaf will be
that, sooner or later, one of the following three events takes place:
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Event 1: The environment makes a move that signifies a choice of Gi in some non-abandoned osubformula
G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn ofH(b). Let d be the nearest predecessor of bwhose justification is the (a⊓) rule.19 It is not hard
to see that, ignoring underlines in toggling osubformulas,H(b) andH(d) are the same. Also, among the junior
children of d is a node c such thatH(c) results fromH(d) by underlining Gi in the osubformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn.
In this case, S jumps to that c.
Event 2: The environment makes a move that signifies a switch from a component Gi to the component Gi+1 in
some non-abandoned osubformula G1
a
. . .
a Gi−1 a Gi a Gi+1 a . . . a Gn of H(b). Again, let d be the nearest
predecessor of bwhose justification is the (a⊓) rule.19 Ignoring underlines in toggling osubformulas,H(b) and
H(d) are the same. Also, among the junior children of d is a node c such thatH(c) results fromH(d) bymoving
the underline from Gi to Gi+1 in the osubformula G1
a
. . .
a Gi−1 a Gi a Gi+1 a . . . a Gn. In this case, S jumps to
that c.
Event 3: The environment makes a move that signifies a switch to Hi in some non-abandoned, non-virgin
osubformula H1 ∧ . . . ∧ Hn (one of the components is underlined) of H(b). Let d be the nearest predecessor
of b whose justification is the (∧) rule and where the osubformula H1 ∧ . . . ∧ Hn is (still) virgin.19 Let
E11 ∧ . . . ∧ E1m1 , . . . , Ek1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ekmk be all of the surface ∧ -osubformulas of F (d) in the left to right order,
and let G11 ∧ . . . ∧ G1m1 , . . . ,Gk1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gkmk be the corresponding osubformulas of H(d). Then, obviously,
H1 ∧ . . . ∧ Hn is Gi1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gimi for one of 1≤ i≤k. Let j= i+1 if i<k, and j=1 if i=k. Let Gjh be the currently active
component of Gj1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gjmj (S finds this component fromΦ). And let c be the child of d such thatH(c) is the
result of underlining Gjh inH(d). Then S jumps to c .
Our remaining task now is to show that S wins F . Let us fix any run Γ that could have been generated in the process of S
playing the game against a clean environment. From now on, Γ and the play/scenario in which it was generated will be the
context of our discourse, so, for instance, when we say ‘‘S has made move α’’, this is to be understood as that S has made
move α in the branch of computation that spells Γ .
We say that a given node b is established iff, in the context of our scenario, it satisfies the following conditions:
• b has been visited a finite, nonzero number of times;
• any node visited after the last visit of b is a descendant of b in the tree.
Note that the set of established nodes is nonempty as (at least) the root is established. Indeed, all other nodes are descendants
of the root. And the root is visited exactly once: it cannot be revisited after the initial visit because backtracking always
happens to a node that is a sibling of another, already visited, node, but the root is not a sibling of anything. Note also that
established nodes form a descendancy chain that starts at the root and goes upward following one of the branches. That is
because of any two established nodes, one – the one that was visited last – is a descendant of the other.
Let then, throughout the rest of this section, ℓ be the established node that was visited last among all established nodes.
In other words, ℓ is the uppermost established node—the node at which the upward chain of established nodes ends, so that
ℓ is the unique established node that has no established descendants. Call such a node the limit node of the play (of Γ , that
is).
Lemma 5.5. The justification of the limit node ℓ is the (∧) rule.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the justification of ℓ is (M), (⊔), (`) or (∨). Then ℓ has a single child c , which is
always visited immediately after a visit of ℓ, and which can be visited only through ascending from ℓ. Therefore, c is also
visited a finite, nonzero number of times. Also, all non-c descendants of ℓ are among the descendants of c , so any node
visited after the last visit of c is a descendant of c . To summarize, c is an established child of ℓ. But this is impossible because
ℓ is the limit node of the play.
Now suppose the justification of ℓ is (a⊓). Let c be the senior child of ℓ. Consider the last visit of ℓ (as an aside, such a
visit would also be the first visit). It will be immediately followed by a visit of c. And c cannot be revisited after that, because
the only way to get to c is to ascend to it from ℓ. So, c is visited a finite, nonzero number of times. If all nodes visited after
the visit of c are descendants of c , then c is an established child of ℓ, which is impossible because ℓ is the limit node. So, at
some time after the last visit of (ℓ and then) c , a backtracking jump occurs from a descendant leaf of c to a node d which is
not a descendant of c. With a moment’s thought, such a d can be seen to be a sibling of c , i.e., a junior child of ℓ. With some
more thought, one can see that, after that, the siblings of dwill be no longer available for backtracking jumps20 and, for this
reason, any node ever visited after the jump to d will be a descendant of d. This makes d an established child of ℓ which,
again, is a contradiction.
From the above contradictions, we conclude that the justification of ℓ can only be (∧). 
19 A little thought convinces us that such a d indeed exists.
20 Hint:Wemay assume that the justification of d is not (M), (⊔) or (`) (otherwise, instead of d, consider its nearest descendant satisfying this condition).
IfF (d) is quasielementary, Events 1 and 2 of Case 6 ofWORKwill never occur after the visit of d, so S will not be able to jump to a sibling of d. And ifF (d) is
not quasielementary, then d is (
a⊓)-justified. Hence ℓ is not the nearest (a⊓)-justified predecessor of any descendant leaf of d, and thus no backtracking
jump is possible from such a leaf to a child of ℓ, i.e. to a sibling of d.
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For the rest of this section, let E11 ∧ . . . ∧ E1m1 , . . . , Ek1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ekmk be all of the surface ∧ -osubformulas of F (ℓ) in the
left to right order, and let
G11 ∧ . . . ∧ G1m1 , . . . , Gk1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gkmk
be the corresponding osubformulas of H(ℓ). Thus, ℓ has m1 + . . . +mk children (if ℓ is a leaf, then k=0), which we
correspondingly denote by
c11 , . . . , c
1
m1 , . . . , c
k
1, . . . , c
k
mk .
We divide these children into k groups, according to their superscripts.
Lemma 5.6. The environment has lost in each osubformula Gi1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gimi (1≤ i≤k) ofH(ℓ).
Proof. We assume that k ≠ 0 (ℓ is not a leaf, that is), for otherwise there is nothing to prove. Let us try to understand
what will be happening after the last visit of ℓ. This event will be immediately followed by a visit of one of the children
c1i (1≤ i≤m1) of group #1. After that, for a while, all new (if any) nodes visited by S will be among the descendants of c
1
i .
This ‘‘while’’, however, cannot last forever. Indeed, if no other nodes are visited, then c1i would be an established child of ℓ,
which is impossible due to ℓ’s being the limit node. Thus, sooner or later, S will jump from a descendant leaf of c1i to a node
d which is not a descendant of c1i . With a little thought, we can see that such a d should be a node of the next (#2) group
of children of ℓ, that is, d=c2j for some 1≤ j≤m2; also, the reason of this jump was that the environment made a switch move
within the G11 ∧ . . . ∧ G1m1 osubformula ofH(ℓ). Nowwe repeat the same analysis for c2j and find that, again, sooner or later,
the environment makes a switch move within the G12 ∧ . . . ∧ G2m2 osubformula ofH(ℓ), which causes a jump to one of the
nodes of group #3 of children of ℓ. And so on. Once a node of the last group #k is reached, the next group will again be group
#1, which starts a new, similar to what we have already seen, cycle. This process will go on forever, so that, for each 1≤h≤k,
a switch move in the osubformula Gh1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ghmh ofH(ℓ)will be made by the environment infinitely many times. But we
know that making infinitely many switches in a toggling (sub)game causes the corresponding player – the environment in
the present case – to lose in that (sub)game. 
Lemma 5.7. The run Γ isH(ℓ)-adequate.
Proof. According to Lemma 5.4, at the time of the last jump to ℓ, the corresponding initial segment of Γ (the then-current
position) wasH(ℓ)-adequate. We need to verify that theH(ℓ)-adequacy of the run is not lost afterwards. This can be done
by examining each of the six conditions of Definition 5.3.
Condition 6 of Definition 5.3 obviously remains satisfied after the last visit of ℓ. This can be seen from an analysis of the
work of S during its visits of leaves.
For condition 1 of Definition 5.3, note that, if S makes infinitely many jumps, then the legality of Γ is guaranteed by
Lemma 5.4, because we have legal positions reached at arbitrarily late times. Otherwise, it is not hard to see that ℓ is a
leaf, which S never leaves after the last visit. During its visit of a leaf, S only mimics the environment’s moves made in
pseudoelementary literals. In view of the already verified condition 6 of Definition 5.3 and Lemma 5.1, together with some
thought, one can see that such moves have to be legal, for otherwise it is the environment who first made an illegal move,
which contradicts our clean environment assumption.
For condition 2 of Definition 5.3, note that, while visiting (∨)- or (∧)-justified nodes (obviously only such nodes are
visited after the last visit of the (∧)-justified ℓ), S does not make any moves signifying a choice of a component of a (virgin
and non-abandoned) choice subformula. And, if such amovewasmade by the environment (after the last visit of ℓ), it would
cause S to make a backtracking jump to a node which is not a descendant of ℓ, which is impossible because ℓ is established.
Condition 3 of Definition 5.3, by Lemma 5.4, was satisfied at the time of the last jump to ℓ. It trivially remains so
afterwards.
Condition 4 of Definition 5.3, again by Lemma 5.4, was satisfied at the time of the last jump to ℓ. It will remain so if
no moves are made afterwards by either player signifying switches in non-abandoned sequential and non-virgin toggling
osubformulas ofH(ℓ). But indeed, suchmoves are notmade.While visiting (∨)- or (∧)-justified nodes, S does notmake any
moves signifying a switch in a (non-abandoned) sequential osubformula. And, if such amovewasmade by the environment,
it would cause S to make a backtracking jump to a node which is not a descendant of ℓ, which is impossible because ℓ is
established. Similarly, while visiting (∨)- or (∧)-justified nodes, S does not make any moves signifying a switch in a non-
virgin toggling osubformula. And, if such a move was made by the environment, it would cause S to make a backtracking
jump to a node which is not a descendant of ℓwhich, again, is impossible.
Finally, that condition 5 of Definition 5.3 also remains satisfied after the last visit of ℓ is evident. 
LetH1 be the result of replacing inH(ℓ) eachnon-abandonedvirgin⊔-osubformula by⊥. In viewof theH(ℓ)-adequacy of
Γ (Lemma5.7), virginity of such an osubformulameans that no choices have beenmadewithin the corresponding osubgame
by the machine, so the machine has lost it. It is then obvious that Γ remains H1-adequate, and Γ is a⊤-won run ofH(ℓ) iff
it is a⊤-won run of H1.
Let H2 be the result of further replacing in H1 each non-abandoned virgin ⊓-osubformula by⊤. Then, for reasons similar
(or symmetric) to the ones in the previous case, Γ remains H2-adequate, and Γ is a⊤-won run of H1 iff it is a⊤-won run of
H2.
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Let H3 be the result of further replacing in H2 each non-virgin choice osubformula by its underlined component (without
including the underline—it should be removed from under the component). And let Γ3 be the result of deleting from Γ all
moves signifying choices in such choice osubformulas. It is not hard to see that Γ3 remains H3-adequate, and Γ2 is a⊤-won
run of H2 iff Γ3 is a⊤-won run of H3.
Let H4 be the result of further replacing in H3 each sequential osubformula by its underlined component (without
including the underline). And let Γ4 be the result of removing from Γ3 all moves that signified a switch in a sequential
osubformula of H3, further removing all moves that signified moves within the non-underlined components of such
osubformulas, and then further removing from the remaining moves each substring ‘‘i.’’ indicating that the move was
made within (the underlined) component #i of a sequential osubformula. For instance, if H3 = P ∨ (Q a R) and Γ3 =
⟨⊤1.α,⊥2.1.β,⊤2.2,⊤2.2.γ ⟩, then H4 = P ∨R and Γ4 = ⟨⊤1.α,⊤2.γ ⟩. It is not hard to see that Γ4 remains H4-adequate,
and Γ3 is a⊤-won run of H3 iff Γ4 is a⊤-won run of H4.
LetH5 be the result of further replacing inH4 each non-virgin toggling osubformula by its underlined component (without
including the underline). And let Γ5 be the result of removing from Γ4 all moves that signified a switch in a non-virgin
toggling osubformula of H4, further removing all moves that signified moves within the non-underlined components of
such osubformulas, and then further removing from the remaining moves each substring ‘‘i.’’ indicating that the move
was made within (the underlined) component #i of a toggling osubformula. For instance, if H4 = P ∨

(Q ∨ R)∧ S and
Γ4 = ⟨⊤1.α,⊥2.1.1.β,⊤2.1.2,⊤2.1.2.γ ⟩, then H5 = P ∨ R and Γ5 = ⟨⊤1.α,⊤2.γ ⟩. It is not hard to see that Γ5 remains
H5-adequate, and Γ4 is a⊤-won run of H4 iff Γ5 is a⊤-won run of H5.
Let H6 be the result of replacing in H5 all general politerals by⊥. And let Γ6 be the result of removing from Γ5 all moves
signifying moves within those politerals. Γ6 clearly remains H6-adequate. It is also obvious that Γ5 is a ⊤-won run of H5 if
(but not necessarily only if)Γ6 is a⊤-won run ofH6. This is so becausewemay assume that⊤ has lost in all general politerals,
so that replacing them with⊥ was legitimate; and if⊤ did not really lose in some of those politerals, that is ‘‘even better’’
due to the monotonicity of the winning conditions associated with all our game operations other than¬.
Now, notice that, in view of clause 2 of Lemma 5.2, H6 coincides with F (ℓ). Also, as noted earlier, the games F andH(ℓ)
are the same (that is, F∗ = H(ℓ)∗). Thus, summarizing our observations of the preceding six paragraphs, we have:
Lemma 5.8. Γ6 is F (ℓ)-adequate (with F (ℓ) here seen as a hyperformula rather than formula), and it is a⊤-won run of F (ℓ)
only if Γ is a⊤-won run of F .
So, fromnowon,we can focus onF (ℓ) and its runΓ6.We continue seeingF (ℓ) – aswell asH7 andH8 defined shortly – as
hyperformulas rather than formulas, so that, when identifying themwith the corresponding games, their pseudoelementary
atoms are interpreted as their origins are. We want to show that Γ6 is a ⊤-won run of F (ℓ)—of the game (F (ℓ))∗, to be
more precise.
Let H7 be the result of replacing in F (ℓ) (in H6, that is) all surface ∧ -osubformulas by ⊤. And let Γ7 be the result of
removing from Γ6 all moves that signified moves within those ∧ -osubformulas. Obviously Γ7 remains H7-adequate. Also,
in view of Lemma 5.6, it is clear that Γ6 is a⊤-won run of F (ℓ) iff Γ7 is a⊤-won run of H7.
Let H8 be the result of replacing in H7 all surface ∨ -osubformulas by ⊥. And let Γ8 be the result of removing from Γ7
all moves that signified moves within those ∨ -osubformulas. Γ8 clearly remains H8-adequate. It is also obvious that Γ7 is
a ⊤-won run of H7 if (but not necessarily only if) Γ8 is a ⊤-won run of H8. This is so because we may assume that ⊤ has
lost in all ∨ -osubformulas, so that replacing them with ⊥ was legitimate; and if ⊤ did not really lose in some of those
osubformulas, that is ‘‘even better’’ due to the earlier pointed out monotonicity of the winning conditions associated with
our game operations.
Now observe that H8 coincides with ‖F (ℓ)‖. Summarizing the observations of the previous two paragraphs and
Lemma 5.8, we thus have:
Lemma 5.9. Γ8 is ‖F (ℓ)‖-adequate (with ‖F (ℓ)‖ here seen as a hyperformula rather than formula), and it is a ⊤-won run of
‖F (ℓ)‖ only if Γ is a⊤-won run of F .
In view of the above lemma, all that now remains to show is that Γ8 is a ⊤-won run of ‖F (ℓ)‖. For this purpose, we
may safely assume that, whenever p and ¬p are (matching) pseudoelementary politerals of F (ℓ), the machine has won in
exactly one of these two politerals. To see the legitimacy of this assumption, remember condition 6 of Definition 5.3. The
latter, together with the fact of the ‖F (ℓ)‖-adequacy of Γ8, implies that the runΘ+ played in p is a⊤-delay of¬Θ−, where
Θ− is the run played in ¬p. If we now assume that the machine has lost in ¬p, meaning that Θ− is a ⊥-won run of ¬p,
then, by the definition of game negation,¬Θ− is a⊤-won run of p. But then, sinceΘ+ is a⊤-delay of¬Θ− and p is a static
game, the property of static games implies that Θ+ is also a ⊤-won run of p. To summarize, if the machine has lost in ¬p,
then it has won in p. In other words, the machine has won in at least one of the osubgames p,¬p. If our assumption about
having won in exactly one of the two osubgames is false and both of these osubgames are won, that is only better from the
machine’s perspective, again due to the earlier mentioned monotonicity of winning conditions.
Let us now consider the true/false assignment τ for the politerals of ‖F (ℓ)‖ that sends an (elementary or
pseudoelementary) politeral to true iff⊤ has won the play within that politeral. In view of the assumption of the preceding
paragraph, obviously τ can also be seen as a truth assignment in the classical sense, i.e. as a true/false assignment for the
atoms (rather than politerals) of ‖F (ℓ)‖ which extends to all subformulas of ‖F (ℓ)‖ in the standard classical way. Since
‖F (ℓ)‖ is a tautology, it is true under τ . This, in turn, obviously implies that Γ8 is a ⊤-won run of ‖F (ℓ)‖. Hence, by
Lemma 5.9, Γ is a⊤-won run of the original F .
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6. Preliminaries for the completeness proof
6.1. Machines against machines
This subsection borrows a discussion from [5], providing certain background information necessary for our completeness
proof but missing in [16], the only external source on computability logic on which the present paper was promised to rely.
For a run Γ and a computation branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that B cospells Γ iff B spells ¬Γ (Γ with all labels
reversed) in the sense of Section 6 of [16]. Intuitively, when a machine C plays as ⊥ (rather than ⊤), then the run that is
generated by a given computation branch B of C is the run cospelled (rather than spelled) by B, for the moves that C makes
get the label⊥, and the moves that its adversary makes get the label⊤.
We say that an EPM C is fair iff, for every valuation e, every e-computation branch of C is fair in the sense of Section 6
of [16].
Lemma 6.1. Assume E is a fair EPM,H is any HPM, and e is any valuation. There are a uniquely defined e-computation branch
BE of E and a uniquely defined e-computation branch BH of H – which we respectively call the (E, e,H)-branch and the
(H, e, E)-branch – such that the run spelled by BH , called theH vs. E run on e, is the run cospelled by BE .
WhenH, E, e are as above, Γ is theH vs. E run on e and A is a game such that Γ is a⊤-won (resp.⊥-won) run of e[A],
we say thatH wins (resp. loses) A against E on e.
A strict proof of the above lemma can be found in [4] (Lemma 20.4), and we will not reproduce the formal proof here.
Instead, the following intuitive explanation should suffice:
Proof idea. AssumeH , E , e are as in Lemma 6.1. The play that we are going to describe is the unique play generatedwhen
the twomachines play against each other, withH in the role of⊤, E in the role of⊥, and e spelled on the valuation tapes of
bothmachines.We can visualize this play as follows. Most of the time during the processH remains inactive (sleeping); it is
woken up only when E enters a permission state, on which eventH makes a (one single) transition to its next computation
step – thatmay ormay not result inmaking amove – and goes back into a sleep thatwill continue until E enters a permission
state again, and so on. From E ’s perspective,H acts as a patient adversary who makes one or zero move only when granted
permission, just as the EPM-model assumes. And fromH ’s perspective, which, like a person in a coma, has no sense of time
during its sleep and hence can think that the wake-up events that it calls the beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant
rate, E acts as an adversary who can make any finite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e. whileH was sleeping), just
as the HPM-model assumes. This scenario uniquely determines an e-computation branch BE of E that we call the (E, e,H)-
branch, and an e-computation branch BH ofH that we call the (H, e, E)-branch. What we call theH vs. E run on e is the
run generated in this play. In particular – since we letH play in the role of⊤ – this is the run spelled by BH . E , who plays in
the role of⊥, sees the same run, only it sees the labels of the moves of that run in negative colors. That is, BE cospells rather
than spells that run. This is exactly what Lemma 6.1 asserts.
6.2. Logic CL14 and its dual
Our proof of the completeness part of Theorem 4.6 employs the conservative, elementary-base fragment CL14 of CL13,
obtained by restricting the language of the latter to elementary-base formulas – we refer to formulas of this restricted
language as CL14-formulas – and (correspondingly) deleting the (M) rule. Logic CL1, historically the first system for
computability logic proven (in [5]) to be sound and complete, is a a, `, ∧, ∨ -free counterpart of CL14.
Of course, CL14 inherits soundness from CL13. In this section we are going to prove the completeness of CL14.
Our completeness proof for CL14, in turn, employs the other logic CL14which is a ‘‘dual’’ of CL14:
Definition 6.2. The language of CL14 is the same as that of CL14, and the rules of inference are:
(∨): H⃗ → F , where F is an instable quasielementary formula, and H⃗ the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following
condition:
• Whenever F has a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, H⃗ contains the result of replacing
in F that osubformula by Ei.
(∧): H → F , where F is a quasielementary formula, and H is the result of replacing in F a surface osubformula
E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(
`⊔): |F |, H⃗ → F , where F is a non-quasielementary formula, and H⃗ is the smallest set of formulas satisfying the
following two conditions:
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, H⃗ contains the result of
replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ` E2 ` . . . ` En, H⃗ contains the result of replacing in F that
osubformula by E2
`
. . .
` En.
The above formula |F | is said to be the senior premise of the rule or its conclusion, and the formulas of H⃗ are the
junior premises.
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(⊓): H → F , whereH is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1⊓ . . .⊓En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(
a
): H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 a E2 a . . . a En by E2 a . . . a En.
Lemma 6.3. CL14 ⊬ F iff CL14 ⊢ F (for any CL14-formula F).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of F . It is sufficient to verify the ‘only if’ part, as the ‘if’ part
(which we do not need anyway) can be handled in a fully symmetric way. So, assume CL14 ⊬ F and let us see that then
CL14 ⊢ F . There are the following cases to consider:
Case 1: F is quasielementary.
Subcase 1.1: F is stable. Then theremust be a CL14-unprovable formulaH satisfying the following condition, for otherwise
F would be CL14-derivable by the (∧) rule:
• H is the result of replacing in F a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
But, if so, by the induction hypothesis, CL14 ⊢ H , whence, by (∧), CL14 ⊢ F .
Subcase 1.2: F is instable. Let H⃗ be the smallest set of formulas such that the following condition is satisfied:
• Whenever F has a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, H⃗ contains the result of replacing in F that
osubformula by Ei.
None of the elements of H⃗ is provable in CL14, for otherwise F would also be derivable in CL14 by (∨). Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis, each element of H⃗ is CL14-provable. Hence, by (∨), we have CL14 ⊢ F .
Case 2: F is not quasielementary.
Subcase 2.1: CL14 ⊢ |F |. Then theremust be a CL14-unprovable formulaH satisfying one of the following two conditions,
for otherwise F would be CL14-derivable by the (a⊓) rule:
• H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 a E2 a . . . a En by E2 a . . . a En.
In either case, by the induction hypothesis, CL14 ⊢ H , whence, by (⊓) (if the first condition is satisfied) or (a) (if the second
condition is satisfied), CL14 ⊢ F .
Subcase 2.2: CL14 ⊬ |F |. Let H⃗ be the smallest set of formulas such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, H⃗ contains the result of replacing in F
that osubformula by Ei.
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ` E2 ` · · · ` En, H⃗ contains the result of replacing in F that osubformula
by E2
` · · · ` En.
None of the elements of H⃗ is provable in CL14, for otherwise F would also be derivable in CL14 by (⊔) or (`). Therefore, by
the induction hypothesis, each element of H⃗ is CL14-provable. Since CL14 ⊬ |F |, by the induction hypothesis, we also have
CL14 ⊢ |F |. Hence, by (`⊔), CL14 ⊢ F . 
6.3. The completeness of CL14
Lemma 6.4. If CL14 ⊬ F , then F is not valid (for any CL14-formula F).
In fact, if CL14 ⊬ F , then F∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that interprets all atoms as finitary predicates of
complexity∆3.
Idea. For the purposes of the present explanation, let us fix a variable x, agree to identify any valuation e with the value
assigned by it to x (as no other variables are going to be relevant), and call that value ‘‘input’’. Our proof of the above
lemma rests on a technique which, for a CL14-unprovable and hence CL14-provable formula F , constructs an EPM C and
an interpretation ∗ such that every HPMH loses the game F∗ against C whenH receives (on the valuation tape) itself – its
own code, to be more precise – as an input.
Revisiting our soundness proof for CL13, the central idea in it was to design⊤’s strategy – the EPM S – following which
guaranteed that the game would be eventually ‘‘brought down to’’ and ‘‘stabilize at’’ L∗ (in the sense that the rest of the
play would essentially be just a play of L∗) for some (∧)-justified and hence stable quasielementary formula L = F (ℓ).
Such a strategy was directly extracted from a CL13-proof of F . And it was shown that, as long as (or rather because) the
elementarization ‖L‖∗ was true, S would be the winner in the game. In a symmetric (yet simpler due to the absence of
general atoms) way, a CL14-proof of F allows us to extract ⊥’s strategy – the EPM C – that makes sure that, in every legal
scenario, ⊤’s play against C over F∗ will be brought down to and stabilize at game L∗ for some (∨)-justified and hence
instable formula L – let us call such a formula L the limit formula of the play – such that C wins as long as ‖L‖∗ is false. The
instability of Lmeans that, whatever the valuation/input e is, ‖L‖∗ is indeed false at e for some ∗, so that C wins F∗ on e for
such ∗. However, the trouble is that ⊤’s different strategies – as well as different inputs e of course – may yield different
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limit formulas L and hence require different, perhaps conflicting, interpretations ∗ to falsify ‖L‖∗ at e. Since we are trying to
show the non-validity rather than non-uniform-validity of F , the whole trick now is to find a one common interpretation ∗
that, for ⊤’s arbitrary strategy (HPM) H , would falsify ‖L‖∗ at some input e, where L is the limit formula that H and that
very input e yield. This is where a diagonalization-style idea comes in. We manage to define an interpretation ∗ that makes
the elementarization of every instable quasielementary formula G imply the following: ‘‘When HPMH plays against C on
inputH , the limit formula is not G’’. Now, if we let any given HPMH play on inputH against C, the elementarization of the
limit formula L of the play – which, under interpretation ∗, claims that L is not really the limit formula – is guaranteed to be
false atH . This eventually translates intoH ’s having lost the game F∗ on inputH .
Proof. Assume CL14 ⊬ F , which, by Lemma 6.3, means that CL14 ⊢ F . Fix a CL14-proof T of F . From such a proof, we can
extract an environment’s interpretation- and valuation-independent EPM-counterstrategy C for F in a way symmetric to
the way we extracted the machine’s EPM-strategy S from a CL13-proof in Section 5. C is a counterstrategy in the sense that
C plays in the role of ⊥ rather than ⊤.21 In fact, C is much simpler than S, because in the present case we only deal with
elementary-base formulas. Below we continue using the terminology and notation adopted in Section 5.
As in Section 5, we see the CL14-proof T as a tree, with each node b of which is associated a formula F (b), such that F is
associated with the root and, whenever c1, . . . , cn are the children of a node b, F (b) follows from F (c1), . . . ,F (cn) by one
of the rules of CL14, said to be the justification of b. Note that the justification of a leaf can only be (∨), as any other rule of
CL14 requires at least one premise.
As in Section 5, with each node b of T we additionally associate a hyperformulaH(b). This association goes like this:
1. With the root node of T weH-associate the hyperformula F˜ obtained from F by underlining the leftmost component of
each sequential osubformula.
2. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c) by the (⊓) rule, namely, F (c) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface
osubformula E1⊓ . . .⊓En by Ei. ThenH(c) is the result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding
osubformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn.
3. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c) by the (a) rule, namely, F (c) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface
osubformula E1
a E2 a · · · a En by E2 a . . . a En. Then H(c) is the result of replacing in H(b) the corresponding
osubformula H1
a
. . .
a Hm a G1 a G2 a . . . a Gn by H1 a . . . a Hm a G1 a G2 a . . . a Gn.
4. Suppose F (b) is obtained from senior premise F (c0) and junior premises F (c1), . . . ,F (ck) by the (
`⊔) rule. Then:
• H(c0) = H(b).
• Suppose F (cj) (1≤ j≤k) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En by Ei. ThenH(cj) is
the result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn.
• Suppose F (cj) (1≤ j≤k) is the result of replacing in F (b) a semisurface osubformula E1 ` E2 ` · · · ` En by
E2
`
. . .
` En. Then H(cj) is the result of replacing inH(b) the corresponding osubformula H1 ` . . . ` Hm ` G1 ` G2` · · · ` Gn by H1 ` . . . ` Hm ` G1 ` G2 ` · · · ` Gn.
5. SupposeF (b) is obtained fromF (c)by the (∧) rule, namely,F (c) is the result of replacing inF (b) a surface osubformula
E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En by Ei. ThenH(c) is the result of underlining inH(b) the ith componentGi of the corresponding osubformula
G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn.
6. Suppose F (b) is obtained from F (c1), . . . ,F (ck) by the (∨) rule. Then:
• Suppose F (cj) (1≤ j≤k) is the result of replacing in F (b) a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En by Ei. ThenH(cj) is the
result of underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn.
Our goal is to construct an environment’s (counter)strategy C and an interpretation ∗ such that any HPM in the role
of ⊤ loses e[F∗] against C for an appropriately selected valuation e. As in Section 5, we define and analyze C in terms of
hyperformulas rather than formulas. The work of C will rely on neither (the yet to be defined) ∗ nor e, so, as before, we shall
usually omit these parameters and identify hyperformulas with the corresponding games. We shall also implicitly rely on
the dual of the clean environment assumption, according to which C’s adversary never makes illegal moves. And we also
rely on certain observations – perhaps in a symmetric, dual form –made in Section 5, such as Conditions (i)–(iv), Lemma 5.2
or Lemma 5.4.
During its work, just like S, our present EPM C maintains a record b, which represents the ‘‘currently visited node’’ of the
tree T . This is exactly how the procedure COUNTERWORK followed by C goes:
Procedure COUNTERWORK: C jumps to the root of T . Then it acts depending on which of the conditions of the following
six cases is satisfied by b:
Case 1: The justification of b is the (⊓) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has a virgin osubformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn, and
H(c) results fromH(b) by underlining Gi for some 1≤ i≤n. Then C makes the move that signifies a choice of the
ith component Gi in the osubgame G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn, and jumps to c.
21 If we want to see C as a strategy in the ordinary sense, then it is a strategy for¬F .
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Case 2: The justification of b is the (a) rule. Let c be the child of b. So,H(b) has an osubformula G1 a . . . a Gi−1 a Gi a Gi+1a
. . .
a Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by moving the underline from Gi to Gi+1. Then C makes the move that
signifies switching (from Gi) to Gi+1 in the corresponding osubgame, and jumps to c.
Case 3: The justification of b is the (`⊔) rule. Then C simply jumps to the senior child of b—i.e., the child with which the
senior premise of F (b) is associated.
Case 4: The justification of b is the (∧) rule. Let c be the child of b. So,H(b)has a virgin osubformulaG1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn, andH(c)
results fromH(b) by underlining one of the n components Gi. Then C makes the move that signifies switching to
Gi in G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 5: The justification of b is the (∨) rule, and b is not a leaf. Let E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En be the leftmost surface ∨ -osubformula of
F (b), and let G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn be the corresponding osubformula ofH(b). Let Gi be the currently active component
of the osubgame G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn. Note that among the children of b is a node c such that H(c) is the result of
underlining inH(b) the ith component Gi of the osubformula G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn. Then C jumps to that c .
Case 6: The justification of b is the (∨) rule, and b is a leaf. C keeps granting permission until one of the following three
events takes place, and then acts accordingly:
Event 1: The adversarymakes amove that signifies a choice ofGi in somenon-abandoned osubformulaG1⊔. . .⊔Gn
of H(b). Let d be the nearest predecessor of b whose justification is the (`⊔) rule. It is not hard to see that,
ignoring underlines in toggling osubformulas, H(b) and H(d) are the same. Also, among the junior children
– i.e., children F -associated with the junior premises – of d is a node c such that H(c) results from H(d) by
underlining Gi in the osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn. In this case, C jumps to that c.
Event 2: The adversary makes a move that signifies a switch from a component Gi to the component Gi+1 in
some non-abandoned osubformula G1
`
. . .
` Gi−1 ` Gi ` Gi+1 ` . . . ` Gn of H(b). Again, let d be the nearest
predecessor of b whose justification is the (`⊔) rule. Ignoring underlines in toggling osubformulas,H(b) and
H(d) are the same. Also, among the junior children of d is a node c such thatH(c) results fromH(d) bymoving
the underline from Gi to Gi+1 in the osubformula G1
`
. . .
` Gi−1 ` Gi ` Gi+1 ` . . . ` Gn. In this case, C jumps to
that c.
Event 3: The adversary makes a move that signifies a switch to Hi in some non-abandoned, non-virgin
osubformula H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn (one of the components is underlined) of H(b). Let d be the nearest predecessor
of b whose justification is the (∨) rule and where the osubformula H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn is (still) virgin. Let
E11 ∨ . . . ∨ E1m1 , . . . , Ek1 ∨ . . . ∨ Ekmk be all of the surface ∨ -osubformulas of F (d) in the left to right order,
and let G11 ∨ . . . ∨ G1m1 , . . . ,Gk1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gkmk be the corresponding osubformulas of H(d). Then, obviously,
H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn is Gi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gimi for one of 1≤ i≤k. Let j= i+1 if i<k, and j=1 if i=k. Let Gjh be the currently active
component of Gj1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gjmj . And let c be the child of d such thatH(c) is the result of underlining Gjh inH(d).
Then C jumps to c.
It is obvious thatC grants permission infinitely many times (even if the adversary makes illegal moves in violation of our
assumption), so that it is a fair EPM.
Note the symmetry between our present C and the machine S from Section 5, as well as between the systems CL14
and CL13, and the corresponding proof trees. The only difference beyond this symmetry is that, in the present case, we do
not have to deal with general or pseudoelementary atoms, and the associated (M) rule. This only makes things simpler. So,
further we can reason in a way symmetric to (but somewhat simpler than) the way we reasoned in Section 5, and establish
that, in any play with environment’s counterstrategy C, a node ℓ – the limit node of the play (defined exactly as before) –
will be reached such that:
• The justification of ℓ is the (∨) rule, and hence F (ℓ) is an instable quasielementary formula, so that ‖F (ℓ)‖ is a non-
tautological elementary formula.
• The overall run generated in the play isH(ℓ)-adequate (‘‘adequacy’’, again, defined as before, albeit Conditions 5 and 6
of Definition 5.3 are now vacuous and should be ignored).
Next, remember from Section 5 howwe constructed the (hyper)formula H8 = ‖F (ℓ)‖ and the run Γ8 fromH(ℓ) and an
arbitrary run Γ – let us fix it throughout this paragraph – of the original game generated in the scenario where S played in
the role of⊤. We can apply a similar (but simpler because some old steps will be redundant due to the absence of general
and pseudoelementary atoms) here and, after reasoning in a way symmetric to the one that took us to Lemma 5.9, find that
Lemma 5.9 holds in the present case in the following, symmetric form:
Γ8 is ‖F (ℓ)‖-adequate, and it is a⊥-won run of ‖F (ℓ)‖ only if Γ is a⊥-won run of F . (8)
But the‖F (ℓ)‖-adequacy ofΓ8 in our present casemeans thatΓ8 is simply the empty run ⟨⟩—unlike the situation in Section5,
where it could contain moves in (the now absent) pseudoelementary oliterals. Thus, rephrasing (8), we have:
If ⟨⟩ is a⊥-won run of ‖F (ℓ)‖, then Γ is a⊥-won run of F . (9)
But ‖F (ℓ)‖ is an elementary formula with all of its atoms interpreted as elementary games. Hence it is obvious that the
empty run ⟨⟩ is a⊥-won run of it if and only if ‖F (ℓ)‖ is simply false. Thus, (9) can be further rephrased as follows:
If ‖F (ℓ)‖ is false, then Γ is a⊥-won run of F . (10)
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What we have observed so far and what is relevant to our further argument, after restoring the so far usually suppressed
parameters ∗ and e, can be summarized as the following lemma:
Lemma 6.5. Let Γ be an arbitrary run that could have been generated when C plays in the role of⊥. Then there is a node ℓ of T ,
called the limit node of Γ , such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The justification of ℓ is (∨).
2. For any interpretation ∗ and valuation e, if e[‖F (ℓ)‖∗] is false, then Γ is a⊥-won run of e[F∗].
Of course, different⊤’s strategies (HPMs)N anddifferent valuations emayyield different runs andhence induce different
limit nodes. So, our goal now is to select an interpretation ∗ such that, for anyHPMN , there is a valuation e atwhich ‖F (ℓ)‖∗
is false, where ℓ is the limit node of the play ofN against C on valuation e. In view of Lemma 6.5, this would mean that no
HPM can win F∗ against C.
Let us fix some standard way of describing HPMs, and let
N1, N2, N3, . . .
be the list of all HPMs arranged according to the lexicographic order of their descriptions, so that each constant c can be
considered the code ofNc . Next, we fix a variable x and agree that, for each constant c ,
ec
is the valuation with ec(x)=c (and, say, ec(y)=1 for any other variable y ≠ x). Further,
ℓc
will denote the limit node of the game over F between Nc , in the role of ⊤, and our C, in the role of ⊥, on valuation ec . In
more precise terms, ℓc is the limit formula of (induced by) theNc vs. C run on ec (remember Lemma 6.1).
Finally, let
d1, . . . , dk
be all nodes of T whose justification is the (∨) rule. For each such di, we fix a classical model (true/false assignment for
atoms)Mi such that
Mi makes the elementarization of F (di) false.
And, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we define the predicate Ki by
Ki is true at a valuation e iff ℓe(x) = di.
Now we define the interpretation ∗ by stipulating that, for each atom p,
p∗ = ∨{Ki | 1≤ i≤k, p is true in Mi}.
(∨Lmeans the ∨-disjunction of all elements ofL, understood as⊥when the setL is empty.)
Consider an arbitrary c ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. In view of clause 1 of Lemma 6.5, wemust have ℓc = dj for one of the j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Fix this j. Observe that, at valuation ec , Kj is true and all other Ki (i ≠ j, 1≤ i≤k) are false. With this fact in mind, it is easy to
see that, for every atom p, p is true inMj iff the predicate p∗ is true at ec . This obviously extends from atoms to their¬,∧,∨-
combinations, so that ‖F (dj)‖ is true inMj iff the predicate ‖F (dj)‖∗ is true at ec . And, by our choice of the modelsMi, the
formula ‖F (dj)‖, i.e. ‖F (ℓc)‖, is false inMj. Consequently, ‖F (ℓc)‖∗ is false at ec . But, according to clause 2 of Lemma 6.5,
the fact that ‖F (ℓc)‖∗ is false at ec implies thatNc loses F∗ against C on valuation ec .
Thus, no Nc computes F∗, meaning that F∗ is not computable, because every HPM is Nc for some c. Note also that, as
promised in the lemma, the predicate p∗ (for any atom p) is finitary as only the value assigned to xmatters.
To officially complete the present proof, it remains to show that
the complexity of p∗ is∆3 (for any atom p). (11)
Remember that an arithmetical predicate A(c) (with c here seen as a variable) is said to have complexityΣ3 iff it can be
written as ∃x∀y∃zB(c, x, y, z) for some decidable predicate B(c, x, y, z); and A(c) is of complexity∆3 iff both A(c) and¬A(c)
are of complexityΣ3.
We defined p∗ as a disjunction of some Ki, that we now think of as unary arithmetical predicates and write as Ki(c).
Disjunction is known to preserve∆3 – as well asΣ3 – complexity, so, in order to verify (11), it is sufficient to show that each
Ki(c) (1≤ i≤k) is of complexity ∆3. Further, we know that the limit node should be one of dj with 1≤ j≤k. Hence, ¬Ki(c) is
equivalent to ∨{Kj(c) | 1≤ j≤k, j ≠ i}. Consequently, in order to show that each Ki(c) is of complexity ∆3, it would suffice
to show that each Ki(c) is of complexityΣ3.
Let, for any node b of T , Jb(c, t)mean ‘‘in the play ofNc against C on valuation ec , at time t , C jumps to node b’’. Jb(c, t) is
a decidable predicate. A decision procedure for it first constructs the machine Nc from number c. Then it lets this machine
play against C on valuation ec as described in the proof idea for Lemma 6.1. In particular, it traces, in parallel, how the
configurations of the twomachines evolve up to the tth computation step of C, i.e. its tth configuration. Then the procedure
looks at whether a jump to the node b occurred in that configuration, and correspondingly says ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’.
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Looking at the meaning of Ki(c), this predicate asserts nothing but that di is the limit node of the play of Nc against C
on valuation ec . In other words, Ki(c) says that, in the play of Nc against C on valuation ec , at some time x (∃x), C jumps
to the node di and, for any y (∀y) greater than x, if C jumps to a node b at time y, then b is a (proper) descendant of di, and
there is a z (∃z) greater than y such that, at time z, C jumps to some node which is not a descendant of b. Looking at this
characterization and taking into account the decidability of the predicate Jb(c, t) used in it (in the form ‘‘... jumps ...’’), with
some minimal experience in dealing with arithmetical complexity, one can see that Ki(c) is indeed of complexity Σ3, as
desired. 
7. The completeness of CL13
This section is devoted to proof of the completeness part of Theorem 4.6, according to which, whenever F is a CL13-
unprovable formula, F is not valid and, in particular, F∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that interprets all
elementary atoms of F as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity∆3, and interprets all general atoms of F as problems
of the form (A11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A1m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Am1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Amm),where each Aji is a finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity∆3.
Outlining our proof idea, we are going to show that, if CL13 ⊬ F , then there is a CL14-formula ⌈F⌉ of the same form as
F that is not provable in CL14. Precisely, ‘‘the same form as F ’’ here means that ⌈F⌉ is the result of rewriting/expanding in
F every general atom P as a certain elementary-base formula Pˇ⊓⊔ . This, in view of the already known completeness of CL14,
immediately yields non-validity for F . As it turns out, the above formulas Pˇ⊓⊔ , that we call molecules, can be chosen to be as
simple as sufficiently long ⊓-conjunctions of sufficiently long ⊔-disjunctions of arbitrary ‘‘neutral’’ (not occurring in F and
pairwise distinct) elementary atoms, with the ‘‘sufficient length’’ of those conjunctions/disjunctions being bounded by the
number of occurrences of general atoms in F .
Intuitively, the reasonwhyCL14 ⊬ ⌈F⌉, i.e. why⊤ cannotwin (the game represented by) ⌈F⌉, is that a smart environment
may start choosing different conjuncts/disjuncts in different occurrences of Pˇ⊓⊔ . The best that ⊤ can do in such a play is to
match any given positive or negative occurrence of Pˇ⊓⊔ with one (but not more!) negative or positive occurrence of the same
subgame — match in the sense that⊤mimics the environment’s moves in order to keep the subgames/subformulas at the
two occurrences identical. Yet, this is insufficient for ⊤ to achieve a guaranteed success. This is so because ⊤’s matching
decisions for ⌈F⌉ could be modeled by appropriate applications of the (M) rule in an attempted CL13-proof for F , and so can
be – through the remaining rules – either player’s decisions associated with choice, sequential and toggling connectives in
the non-molecule parts of ⌈F⌉. A winning strategy (CL14-proof) for ⌈F⌉would then translate into a CL13-proof for F , which,
however, does not exist. What follows is an implementation of the idea we have just outlined.
Fix a CL13-formula F . LetP be the set of all general atoms occurring in F . Let us fixm as the total number of occurrences
of such atoms in F ;22 if there are fewer than two such occurrences, then we takem=2.
For the rest of this section, let us agree that
a, b always range over {1, . . . ,m}.
For each P ∈ P and each a, b, let us fix an elementary atom
• Pˇab
not occurring in F . We assume that Pˇab ≠ Qˇ cd as long as either P ≠ Q or a ≠ c or b ≠ d. Note that the Pˇab are elementary
atoms despite our ‘‘tradition’’ according to which the capital letters P,Q , . . . stand for general atoms.
Next, for each P ∈ P and each a, we define
• Pˇa⊔ = Pˇa1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇam.
Finally, for each P ∈ P , we define
• Pˇ⊓⊔ = Pˇ1⊔ ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pˇm⊔ , i.e. Pˇ⊓⊔ = (Pˇ11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ1m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Pˇm1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇmm ).
We refer to the above formulas Pˇab , Pˇ
a⊔ and Pˇ⊓⊔ asmolecules, in particular, P-based molecules. To differentiate between
the three sorts of molecules, we call the molecules of the type Pˇab small, call the molecules of the type Pˇ
a⊔ medium, and
call the molecules of the type Pˇ⊓⊔ large. Thus, where k is the cardinality of P , altogether there are k large molecules, k× m
medium molecules and k×m×m small molecules.
For simplicity, for the rest of this section we assume/pretend that the languages of CL13 and CL14 have no nonlogical
atoms other than those occurring in F plus the atoms Pˇba (P ∈ P , a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). This way the scope of the term
‘‘formula’’ is correspondingly redefined.
22 In fact, a much smallermwould be sufficient for our purposes. E.g.,m can be chosen to be such that no given general atom hasmore thanm occurrences
in F . But why try to economize?
1000 G. Japaridze / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 971–1004
An occurrence of a moleculeM in a formula can be positive or negative. While a positive occurrence literally meansM , a
negative occurrence looks like¬M , which – unlessM is a smallmolecule – should be considered a standard abbreviation. For
example, a negative occurrence of the mediummolecule Pˇa1 ⊔ . . .⊔ Pˇam is nothing but an (‘‘ordinary’’, positive) occurrence of
¬Pˇa1 ⊓ . . .⊓¬Pˇam. One should be especially careful when applying the terms ‘‘positive occurrence’’ and ‘‘negative occurrence’’
to small molecules, as here the meaning of our terminology somewhat diverges from its earlier-used meaning for atoms.
Specifically, a positive occurrence of a small molecule Pˇab means – as expected – an occurrence that comes without ¬ in
the formula. As for a negative occurrence of the molecule Pˇab (as opposed to the atom Pˇ
a
b ), it means an occurrence of the
subformula ¬Pˇab rather than just the Pˇab part of it under ¬. So, for example, the result of replacing the negative occurrence
of the molecule Pˇab by Q in the formula E ∨ ¬Pˇab is the formula E ∨ Q rather than E ∨ ¬Q , as¬was a part of what we call a
‘‘negative occurrence of Pˇab ’’.
Let us say that a (positive or negative) occurrence of a molecule in a given CL14-formula is independent iff it is not a part
of another (‘‘larger’’) molecule. For example, the negative occurrence of the mediummolecule Pˇ11 ⊔ . . .⊔ Pˇ1m in the following
formula is independent while its positive occurrence is not:
(¬Pˇ11 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇ1m) ∨

(Pˇ11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ1m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Pˇm1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇmm )

.
Of course, semisurface occurrences of molecules are always independent, and so are any – semisurface or non-semisurface
– occurrences of large molecules.
Let E be a CL14-formula. By an isolated small molecule of E (or E-isolated small molecule, or a small molecule isolated
in E) we will mean a small molecule that has exactly one independent occurrence in E. We will say that such a molecule is
positive or negative depending on whether its independent occurrence in E is positive or negative.
Next, the floorification of E, denoted
⌊E⌋,
is the result of replacing in E every positive (resp. negative) independent occurrence of every P-based (each P ∈ P ) large,
medium and E-isolated small molecule23 by the general literal P (resp. ¬P).
Lemma 7.1. Assume E is a quasielementary formula provable in CL14, and E ′ is the result of replacing in E some (positive or
negative) isolated small molecules by⊥. Then CL14 ⊢ E ′.
Proof. Induction on the lengths of proofs. Assume the conditions of the lemma. The rules (a⊓), (⊔) and (`) can only derive
non-quasielementary formulas. So, the last rule used in the proof of E should be either (∨) or (∧). We correspondingly
consider the following two cases.
CASE 1: E is derived by (∨) from a premise G. Obviously then E ′ follows by the same rule (∨) from a quasielementary
formula G′ which is the result of replacing in G some isolated small molecules by ⊥. And, by the induction hypothesis,
CL14 ⊢ G′. Hence, CL14 ⊢ E ′.
CASE 2: E is derived by (∧) from premises G1, . . . ,Gn (possibly n=0). It is obvious that, as long as E ′ is stable, it follows by
the same rule (∧) from formulas G′1, . . . ,G′n, where each G′i is the result of replacing in Gi some isolated small molecules by⊥. And, by the induction hypothesis, each G′i is provable. So, it remains to show that E ′ is stable, i.e., that ‖E ′‖ is a tautology.
Since E is derived by (∧), E is stable, i.e., ‖E‖ is a tautology. But notice that the only difference between ‖E‖ and ‖E ′‖ is that,
wherever the former has (occurrences of) isolated small – positive or negative – molecules, the latter has ⊥ instead. It is
known from classical logic that replacing isolated literals (literals that contain an atom that has a single occurrence in the
formula) by whatever formulas does not destroy tautologicity. So, ‖E ′‖ is indeed a tautology. 
Lemma 7.2. For any quasielementary formula E, if CL14 ⊢ E, then CL14 and hence CL13 proves |⌊E⌋|.
Proof. Assume E is a quasielementary formula. Observe that then |⌊E⌋| is nothing but the result of replacing in E all isolated
small molecules by⊥. Therefore, by Lemma 7.1, if CL14 ⊢ E, we also have CL14 ⊢ |⌊E⌋|. 
We say that a CL14-formula E is good iff the following conditions are satisfied:
Condition (i): E contains at mostm independent occurrences of molecules.
Condition (ii): Only large molecules (may) have independent non-semisurface occurrences in E.
Condition (iii): Each small molecule has at most one positive and at most one negative independent occurrence in E.
Condition (iv): For each medium molecule Pˇa⊔, E has at most one positive independent occurrence of Pˇa⊔, and when E has
such an occurrence, then for no b does E have a positive independent occurrence of the small molecule Pˇab .
Lemma 7.3. For any good CL14-formula E, if CL14 ⊢ E, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
23 Remember what was said earlier about the meaning of ‘‘negative occurrence’’ for small molecules.
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Proof. Assume E is a good CL14-formula, and CL14 ⊢ E. By induction on the length of the CL14-proof of E, we want to show
that CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋. We need to consider the following five cases, depending on which of the rules of CL14 was used (last) to
derive E.
CASES 1-2: E is derived by either (∧) or (∨). Then E is quasielementary and, by Lemma 7.2, CL13 ⊢ |⌊E⌋|. But since E is
quasielementary, (E and hence) ⌊E⌋ does not contain any sequential or choice operators. This means that ⌊E⌋ follows from
|⌊E⌋| (no junior premises) by (a⊓). So, CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
CASE 3: E is derived by (a⊓). Let us fix the set H⃗ of junior premises of E. Each formula H ∈ H⃗ is provable in CL14. Hence,
by the induction hypothesis, we have:
For any H ∈ H⃗, if H is good, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (12)
We consider the following three subcases. The first two subcases are notmutually exclusive, and either one can be chosen
when both of them apply. Specifically, Subcase 3.1 (resp. 3.2) is about when E has a positive (resp. negative) semisurface
occurrence of a large (resp. medium) molecule. Then, as we are going to see, replacing that molecule by a ‘‘safe’’ ⊓-conjunct
of it, corresponding to a smart environment’s possible move, yields a good formula H from H⃗ such that ⌊E⌋ = ⌊H⌋. This, by
(12), automaticallymeans the CL13-provability of ⌊E⌋. The remaining Subcase 3.3 is aboutwhen all semisurface occurrences
of large (resp. medium) molecules in E are negative (resp. positive). This will be shown to imply that ⌊E⌋ follows from its
quasielementarization and the floorifications of some elements of H⃗ by (a⊓) for ‘‘the same reasons as’’ E follows from its
quasielementarization and H⃗ .
Subcase 3.1: E has a positive semisurface occurrence of a large molecule Pˇ⊓⊔ , i.e., an occurrence of
Pˇ1⊔ ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pˇm⊔ .
Pick any a ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that neither themediummolecule Pˇa⊔ nor any smallmolecule Pˇab (whatever b) have independent
occurrences in E. Such an a exists, for otherwise we would have at least m+1 independent occurrences of molecules in E
(including the occurrence of Pˇ⊓⊔ ), which violates Condition (i) of the definition of ‘‘goodness’’. Let H be the result of replacing
in E the above occurrence of Pˇ⊓⊔ by Pˇa⊔. Clearly H ∈ H⃗ . Observe that when transferring from E to H , we just ‘‘downsize’’ Pˇ⊓⊔
and otherwise do not create any additional independent occurrences of molecules, so Condition (i) continues to be satisfied
for H . Neither do we introduce any new non-semisurface occurrences of molecules or any new independent occurrences of
small molecules, so Conditions (ii) and (iii) also continue to hold forH . And our choice of a obviously guarantees that so does
Condition (iv). To summarize,H is good. Therefore, by (12), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Finally, note that, when floorifying a given formula,
both Pˇ⊓⊔ and Pˇa⊔ get replaced by the same atom P; and, as the only difference between E and H is that H has Pˇa⊔ where E has
Pˇ⊓⊔ , obviously ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. Thus, CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 3.2: E has a negative semisurface occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇa⊔—that is, an occurrence of
¬Pˇ1a ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇma .
Pick any b such that E does not have an independent occurrence of Pˇab . Again, in view of Condition (i), such a b exists. Let
H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of ¬Pˇ1a ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇma by ¬Pˇab . Certainly H ∈ H⃗ . Conditions (i) and (ii)
continue to hold for H for the same reasons as in Subcase 3.1. In view of our choice of b, Condition (iii) is also inherited by
H from E. And so is Condition (iv), because H has the same positive occurrences of (the same) molecules as E does. Thus, H
is good. Therefore, by (12), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. It remains to show that ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. Note that when floorifying E, Pˇa⊔ gets replaced
by P . But so does Pˇab when floorifying H because, by our choice of b, Pˇ
a
b is an isolated small molecule of H . Since the only
difference between H and E is that H has Pˇab where E has Pˇ
a⊔, it is then obvious that indeed ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 3.3: Neither of the above two conditions is satisfied. This means that in E all semisurface occurrences of large
molecules are negative, and all semisurface occurrences of medium molecules are positive. Every such occurrence is an
occurrence of a⊔-formulawhich, aswe remember, gets replaced by⊥when transferring from E to |E|; but the samehappens
to the corresponding occurrences of ¬P or P in ⌊E⌋ when transferring from ⌊E⌋ to |⌊E⌋|. Based on this observation, with a
little thought we can see that |⌊E⌋| is ‘‘almost the same’’ as |E|; specifically, the only difference between these two formulas
is that |⌊E⌋| has ⊥ where |E| has isolated small molecules (positive or negative). And this, in turn, obviously means that
|⌊E⌋| = |⌊|E|⌋|. As E is derived by (a⊓), we have CL14 ⊢ |E|. Hence, by Lemma 7.2, CL13 ⊢ |⌊|E|⌋| and, since |⌊|E|⌋| = |⌊E⌋|,
we have
CL13 ⊢ |⌊E⌋|. (13)
Now consider an arbitrary formula H ′ that is the result of replacing in ⌊E⌋ a semisurface occurrence of a subformula
G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G′n by G′i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Our goal is to show that
CL13 ⊢ H ′ (arbitrary H ′ satisfying the above condition). (14)
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The logical structure of E is the same as that of ⌊E⌋, with the only difference that, wherever ⌊E⌋ has general literals, E has
molecules. Hence E has an occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn where ⌊E⌋ has the above occurrence of G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G′n.
Let then H be the result of replacing G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn by Gi in E. Of course H ∈ H⃗ . So, in view of (12), it would suffice to show (in
order to verify (14)) that H is good and H ′ = ⌊H⌋. Let us first see that H is good. When transferring from E to H , Condition
(i) is inherited by H for the same or a similar reasons as in all of the previous cases. So is Condition (ii) because we are not
creating any new non-semisurface occurrences. Furthermore, notice that G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn is not a molecule, for otherwise in
⌊E⌋ we would have a general literal rather than G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G′n. Hence, in view of Condition (ii), Gi is not a small or medium
molecule. This means that, when transferring from E to H , we are not creating new independent/semisurface occurrences
of any small or mediummolecules, so that Conditions (iii) and (iv) are also inherited byH from E. To summarize,H is indeed
good. Finally, it is also rather obvious that H ′ = ⌊H⌋. The only case when we might have H ′ ≠ ⌊H⌋would be if there was a
small molecule Pˇab isolated in E but not in H , or vice versa (so that the independent occurrence of that molecule in E would
become P in ⌊E⌋ and hence in H ′ but stay Pˇab in ⌊H⌋, or vice versa). But, as we observed just a little while ago, E and H do not
differ in their independent/semisurface occurrences of small molecules.
Next, consider an arbitrary formula H ′′ that is the result of replacing in ⌊E⌋ a semisurface occurrence of a subformula
G′′1
a G′′2 a . . . a G′′n by G′′2 a . . . a G′′n . Our goal is to show that
CL13 ⊢ H ′′ (arbitrary H ′′ satisfying the above condition). (15)
This case is very similar to the case handled in the previous paragraph. The logical structure of E the same as that of ⌊E⌋, so
E has an occurrence of a subformula G1
a G2 a . . . a Gn where ⌊E⌋ has the above occurrence of G′′1 a G′′2 a · · · a G′′n . Let then
H be the result of replacing G1
a G2 a . . . a Gn by G2 a . . . a Gn in E. Of course H ∈ H⃗ . Continuing arguing as in the previous
paragraph, we find that H is good and that H ′′ = ⌊H⌋, which, by (12), implies the desired (15).
Based on (13), (14) and (15), we find that ⌊E⌋ is derivable in CL13 by (a⊓).
The remaining two CASES 4 and 5 are about when E is derived by (⊔) or (`) from a premise H . Such an H turns out to be
good and hence (by the induction hypothesis) its floorification CL13-provable. And, ‘‘almost always’’, either ⌊E⌋ = ⌊H⌋, or
⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (⊔) or (`) for the same reasons as E follows from H . An exception is the special case of (⊔) when
H is the result of replacing in E a positive occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇa⊔ by one of its disjuncts Pˇab such that E has a
negative independent occurrence of Pˇab . Using our earlier terms, this is a step signifying ⊤’s (final) decision to ‘‘match’’ the
two P-based molecules. In this case, while ⌊E⌋ is neither the same as ⌊H⌋ nor does it follow from ⌊H⌋ by (⊔), it does follow
from ⌊H⌋ by (M). The secret is that the two P-based molecules are non-isolated small molecules in H and hence remain
elementary literals in ⌊H⌋, while they turn into general literals in ⌊E⌋.
CASE 4: E is derived by (⊔). That is, we have CL14 ⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in E a semisurface occurrence
of a subformula G = G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Fix these formulas and this number i. Just as in CASE 3
(statement (12)), based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (16)
We need to consider the following three subcases that cover all possibilities:
Subcase 4.1: G is not a molecule. Reasoning (almost) exactly as we did when justifying (14), we find that H is good.
Therefore, by (16), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, a little thought can convince us that ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (⊔), so that CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 4.2: G is a negative large molecule¬Pˇ1⊔ ⊔ . . .⊔¬Pˇm⊔ . So, Gi = ¬Pˇ i⊔. A (now already routine for us) examination of
Conditions (i)–(iv) reveals that each of these four conditions is inherited by H from E, so that H is good. Therefore, by (16),
CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, ⌊H⌋ can be easily seen to be the same as ⌊E⌋, and thus CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 4.3: G is a positive medium molecule Pˇa1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇam. So, Gi = Pˇai . There are two subsubcases to consider:
Subsubcase 4.3.1: E contains no independent occurrence of Pˇai . One can easily verify that H is good and that ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋.
By (16), we then get the desired CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subsubcase 4.3.2: E has an independent occurrence of Pˇai . Since E also has a positive independent occurrence of Pˇ
a⊔,
Condition (iv) implies that the above occurrence of Pˇai in E is negative. This, in conjunction with Condition (iii), means
that E does not have any other independent occurrences of Pˇai , and thus H has exactly two – one negative and one positive
– independent occurrences of Pˇai . This guarantees that Condition (iii) is satisfied for H , because H and E only differ in that
H has Pˇai where E has Pˇ
a⊔. Conditions (i) and (ii) are straightforwardly inherited by H from E. Finally, Condition (iv) also
transfers from E to H because, even though H – unlike E – has a positive independent occurrence of Pˇai , it no longer has a
positive independent occurrence of Pˇa⊔ (which, by the same Condition (iv) for E, was unique in E). Thus, H is good and, by
(16), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Note that sinceH is good, by Condition (ii), both of the independent occurrences of Pˇai in it are semisurface
occurrences. The same, of course, is true for the corresponding occurrences of Pˇai and Pˇ
a⊔ in E. Let us now compare ⌊E⌋with
⌊H⌋. According to our earlier observation, Pˇai only has one independent occurrence in E, i.e. Pˇai is E-isolated. Hence the
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independent occurrence of Pˇai , just like that of Pˇ
a⊔, gets replaced by P when floorifying E. On the other hand, Pˇai is no longer
isolated in H , so the two independent occurrences of it stay as they are when floorifying H . Based on this observation, we
can easily see that the only difference between ⌊E⌋ and ⌊H⌋ is that ⌊E⌋ has the general atom P where ⌊H⌋ has the (two
occurrences of) elementary atom Pˇai . Since ⌊E⌋ does not contain Pˇai (because the only independent occurrence of it in E, as
well as all large andmedium P-basedmolecules, got replaced by P when floorifying E), and since we are talking about two –
one positive and one negative – semisurface occurrences of P in ⌊E⌋, we find that ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (M). We already
know that CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Hence CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
CASE 5: E is derived by (`). That is, we have CL14 ⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in E a semisurface occurrence
of a subformula G1
` G2 ` · · · ` Gk by G2 ` . . . ` Gk. Just as in CASES 3 and 4, based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (17)
Reasoning as in the previous cases, we further find that H is good, and thus, by (17), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, a moment’s thought
convinces us that ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (`), so that CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋. 
Nowwe are very close to finishing our completeness proof for CL13. Assume CL13 ⊬ F . Let ⌈F⌉ be the result of replacing
in F all occurrences of each general atom P ∈ P by Pˇ⊓⊔ . Obviously ⌈F⌉ is good. Clearly we also have ⌊⌈F⌉⌋ = F , so that
CL13 ⊬ ⌊⌈F⌉⌋. Therefore, by Lemma 7.3, CL14 ⊬ ⌈F⌉. Hence, by Lemma 6.4, there is an interpretation Ď that interprets every
elementary atom as a finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity∆3, such that
⌈F⌉Ď is not computable. (18)
Let ∗ be an interpretation such that:
• ∗ agrees with Ď on all elementary atoms;
• ∗ interprets each general atom P ∈ P as (Pˇ⊓⊔ )Ď.
Clearly ∗ interprets atoms as promised in Theorem 4.6. It is also obvious that F∗ = ⌈F⌉Ď. Therefore, by (18), F∗ is not
computable. The completeness part of Theorem 4.6 is now proven.
Appendix. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Lemma A.1.
1. Assume A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) are constant static games,Ω is a℘-delay of Γ , andΩ is a℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. Then
Γ is also a ℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
2. Similarly for A1
a
. . .
a An.
3. Similarly for A1 ∧ A2 ∧ A3 ∧ . . . and A1 a A2 a A3 a . . ..
Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction on the length of the shortest illegal initial segment ofΩ .
CLAUSE 1. Assume the conditions of clause 1 of the lemma. We want to show that Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
Let ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩ be the shortest (℘-) illegal initial segment ofΩ . Let ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ be the shortest initial segment of Γ containing all
℘-labeled moves24 of ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩. IfΦ is a℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An, then so is Γ and we are done. Therefore, for the
rest of the proof, we assume that
Φ is not a ℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. (19)
LetΘ be the sequence of those¬℘-labeled moves of Ψ that are not inΦ . Obviously
⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩ is a ℘-delay of ⟨Φ, ℘α,Θ⟩. (20)
We also claim that
Φ is a legal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. (21)
Indeed, suppose this was not the case. Then, by (19), Φ should be ¬℘-illegal. This would make Γ a ¬℘-illegal run of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An with Φ as an illegal initial segment which is shorter than ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩. Then, by the induction hypothesis, any
run for which Γ is a¬℘-delay, would be¬℘-illegal. But, as observed in Lemma 4.6 of [4], the fact thatΩ is a ℘-delay of Γ
implies thatΓ is a¬℘-delay ofΩ . So,Ω would be¬℘-illegal, which is a contradiction because, according to our assumption,
Ω is ℘-illegal.
We are continuing our proof. There are three possible reasons to why ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩ is an illegal (whileΨ being legal) position
of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An:
24 In this context, different occurrences of the same labmove count as different labmoves. So, a more accurate phrasing would be ‘‘as many ℘-labeled
moves as...’’ instead ‘‘all the ℘-labeled moves of ...’’.
1004 G. Japaridze / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 971–1004
Reason 1: α does not have the form i or i.β for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, in view of (21), ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ is a ℘-illegal position
of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. As ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ happens to be an initial segment of Γ , the latter then is a ℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
Reason 2: α = i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, but ℘ = ⊤. With (21) in mind, ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ can be seen to be a ℘-illegal position of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. Hence, as ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ is an initial segment of Γ , the latter is a ℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
Reason 3: α = i.β for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, but ⟨Ψ i., ℘β⟩ is not a legal run of Ai. That is, ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩i. is a ℘-illegal position
of Ai. (20) obviously implies that ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩i. is a ℘-delay of ⟨Φ, ℘α,Θ⟩i.. Therefore, since Ai is static, clause 1 of Lemma 5.1
yields that ⟨Φ, ℘α,Θ⟩i. is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. Notice that ⟨Φ, ℘α,Θ⟩i. = ⟨Φ i., ℘β,Θ i.⟩. A ℘-illegal position will
remain ℘-illegal after removing a block of ¬℘-labeled moves (in particular, Θ i.) at the end of it. Hence, ⟨Φ i., ℘β⟩ is a ℘-
illegal position of Ai. In view of (21), this implies that ⟨Φ, ℘α = ℘.β⟩ is not a legal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An, so that ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩
is a ℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An, and then so is Γ because ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ is an initial segment of it.
CLAUSE 2. The reasoning here is the same as in the proof of clause 1, with the only difference that one more possible
reason should be considered to why ⟨Ψ , ℘α⟩ is an illegal (while Ψ being legal) position of A1 a . . . a An:
Reason 4: α = i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ℘ = ⊥, but either (1) Ψ does not contain switch moves and i ≠ 2, or (2)
the last switch move of Φ is not i − 1. In either case, with (21) in mind, ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ can be seen to be a ℘-illegal position of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An. Hence, as ⟨Φ, ℘α⟩ is an initial segment of Γ , the latter is a ℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
CLAUSE 3. The reasoning here is virtually the same as in (the corresponding) clause 1 or clause 2,with only ‘‘i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}’’
instead of ‘‘i ∈ {1, . . . , n}’’. 
Since ∨ and ` are expressible in terms of ∧, a and¬ (with¬ already known to preserve the static property), in order
to prove Theorem 3.2, considering only ∧ and a is sufficient. For simplicity, here we restrict ourselves to the n-ary case of
∧. Adapting our argument to the n-ary case of a, or the infinite cases of ∧ and a, does not present any problem.
Assume A1, . . . , An are static constant games, Γ is a ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An, andΩ is a ℘-delay of Γ . Our goal is to
show thatΩ is also a ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
If Ω is a ¬℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An, then it is won by ℘ and we are done. So, assume that Ω is not ¬℘-illegal.
According to the earlier mentioned Lemma 4.6 of [4], ifΩ is a ℘-delay of Γ , then Γ is a ¬℘-delay ofΩ . So, by Lemma A.1,
our Γ cannot be ¬℘-illegal, for otherwise so would be Ω . Γ also cannot be ℘-illegal, because otherwise it would not be
won by ℘. Consequently, Ω cannot be ℘-illegal either, for otherwise, by Lemma A.1, Γ would be ℘-illegal. Thus, we have
narrowed down our considerations to the case when both Γ andΩ are legal runs of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
The fact that Γ is a legal, ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An implies that, where Ai is the active (last-chosen) component of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An in Γ , Γ i. is a ℘-won run of Ai. Taking into account thatΩ i. is obviously a ℘-delay of Γ i. and that Ai is static,
the above, in turn, implies that Ω i. is a ℘-won run of Ai, which, taking into account that Ω is a legal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An
and that the active component of the latter in Ω is obviously the same Ai, means nothing but that Ω is a ℘-won run of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An.
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